



Federation for American Afghan Action

September 29, 1984

Board Members

Neal B. Blair—Chairman
Sayed J. Houssein—President
Don Weidenweber
Abdul Madjid Zabuli
Thomas Gouttierre

Executive Director

Andrew L. Eiva

Legislative Director

Matthew D. Erulkar

TO: MEDIA

FROM: ANDREW L. EIVA, MATTHEW D. ERULKAR (202)547-1878/0202

SUBJECT: INFORMATION USEFUL IN COVERING STORIES ON AFGHANISTAN
EXPECTED TO BREAK IN WASHINGTON DURING WEEK OF
1-8 OCTOBER

Pegs this week will be:

1. The sudden surge of grass roots, political pressure, and media interest for effective aid to Afghans
2. Passage (or killing of) Tsongas effective aid resolution (S. Con. Res. 74) in Senate
3. Passage (or killing of) House concurrent version (H. Con. Res. 237)
4. Introduction of Sen. D'Amato's Afghan assistance legislation

Release of new information in the following areas:

1. Executive branch coverup of its ineffective aid program to Afghans
2. Design of an effective air defense package for the Afghans
3. Quantification of the shortfall between what CIA task force got and what guerrillas got

As a result, the significant developments expected this week include:

1. Orchestration of grass roots leverage and congressional interest in overcoming five years of bureaucratic resistance that tried to prevent the effective support to the Afghans
2. Intensification of scrutiny of CIA's ineffective program to support guerrillas and exposure of its attempts to cover up while a million Afghans died.



Federation for American Afghan Action

September 29, 1984

CURRENT SITUATION AS AFGHAN EFFECTIVE SUPPORT RESOLUTION HEADS FOR VOTE IN SENATE AND HOUSE

Board Members

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The 98th Congress took a major step toward passing the Afghan effective support resolution (S. Con. Res. 74/H. Con. Res. 237) on Tuesday, September 25, when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported favorably the Senate Resolution out of Committee.

Senator Paul Tsongas (D-MA) solved the objections of the State Department, the Pakistani Embassy and Senator Charles Mc. Mathias (R-MD) by negotiating new language for the controversial support clause, Clause 2 of the resolution.

The new language now reads: "to support effectively the Afghan people in their fight for freedom." This language, with the preceding wording "...it would be indefensible to provide only enough aid for the freedom fighters to fight and die but not enough to advance their cause of freedom," specifies the type of aid discussed.

With the objections dropped, cosponsorship for the resolution has risen to 71 Senators (35 Dem. and 3 Rep.), and all that is needed is a vote to be scheduled by Sen. Howard Baker, Senate Majority Leader. A roll call vote is hoped for, rather than the unanimous consent provision which killed the resolution when it was brought to the floor in 1982 with 99 original cosponsors as S. Con. Res. 126.

As a result of the new language and the Senate action, the House has placed a priority on passing its identical version. The resolution was recommended favorably by Staff Director Bill Barnds of the Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee on Wednesday, September 26. Although the full House Foreign Affairs Committee will not meet again this session, Rep. Dante Fascell, Chairman of House Foreign Affairs and a previous opponent of the resolution, has pledged to take the resolution off the Speaker's table when it is brought over from the Senate and have it brought to a vote. There are 173 cosponsors of H. Con. Res. 237 in the House (97 Dem. and 76 Rep.).

Passage of S. Con. Res. 74/H. Con. 237 will set a historical precedent as the first time Congress has called for support to a guerrilla liberation movement. This will follow the action of the Democratic Party this summer when the 1984 Democratic Party Platform called for material assistance to the Afghan resistance and became the first major U.S. political body to call for support to a guerrilla movement.

To encourage and support the people of Afghanistan in their struggle to be free from foreign domination.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER 6 (legislative day, OCTOBER 3), 1983

Mr. TSONGAS (for himself, Mr. ABDNOR, Mr. ANDREWS, Mr. ARMSTRONG, Mr. BENTSEN, Mr. BINGAMAN, Mr. BOSCHWITZ, Mr. BRADLEY, Mr. BUMPERS, Mr. BYRD, Mr. CHILES, Mr. COCHRAN, Mr. COHEN, Mr. D'AMATO, Mr. DECONCINI, Mr. DIXON, Mr. DOLE, Mr. DURENBERGER, Mr. EAGLETON, Mr. EXON, Mr. FORD, Mr. GARN, Mr. GLENN, Mr. GRASSLEY, Mr. HART, Mr. HATCH, Mr. HEINZ, Mr. HUDDLESTON, Mrs. KASSEBAUM, Mr. KENNEDY, Mr. LAXALT, Mr. LEVIN, Mr. LUGAR, Mr. MATTINGLY, Mr. MELCHER, Mr. MOYNIHAN, Mr. MURKOWSKI, Mr. NICKLES, Mr. PELL, Mr. PRESSLER, Mr. PROXMIRE, Mr. PRYOR, Mr. QUAYLE, Mr. RANDOLPH, Mr. RIEGLE, Mr. RUDMAN, Mr. SARBANES, Mr. SASSER, Mr. SIMPSON, Mr. SPECTER, Mr. STENNIS, Mr. WARNER, Mr. WILSON, Mr. ZOBINSKY, Mr. HOLLINGS, Mr. PERCY, and Mr. JEPSEN) submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

To encourage and support the people of Afghanistan in their struggle to be free from foreign domination.

Whereas the freedom fighters of Afghanistan have withstood the might of the Soviet Army for over three and a half years and gained the admiration of free men and women the world over with their courageous sacrifice, bravery, and determination;

Whereas the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is the first Soviet seizure of independent territory since the 1940's and represents a dangerous and unacceptable development in Soviet foreign policy;

Whereas the struggle for liberation in Afghanistan can succeed if those of us who believe in freedom come to its support;

Whereas the European Parliament, the Non-Aligned Movement, the United Nations, the Conference of Islamic Nations, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and the United States Congress have all condemned the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan;

Whereas the Soviet airbases in southwest Afghanistan present an unacceptable threat to the Hormuz oil passage lanes which are so vital to the free world's economies;

Whereas many individuals and private organizations all over the world have already sent substantial aid to the Afghan freedom fighters;

Whereas it would be indefensible to provide the freedom fighters with only enough aid to fight and die but not enough to advance their cause of freedom: Now, therefore, be it

1 *Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives*
2 *concurring), That it should be the policy of the United*
3 *States—*

4 {1} to encourage the people of
5 Afghanistan to continue their struggle to
6 be free of foreign domination;
7 effectively
7 {2} to support/the people of
8 Afghanistan in their fight for freedom;

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(3) to pursue a negotiated settlement of the war in Afghanistan, based on the total withdrawal of Soviet troops and the recognition of the inalienable right of the Afghan people to choose their own destiny free from outside interference or coercion, so that the four million Afghan refugees can return to their country in safety and in honor.

CLAUSE TWO OLD WORDING

"to provide the people of Afghanistan, if they so request, with material assistance, as the United States considers appropriate, to help them fight effectively for their freedom."



American Afghan Education Fund

June 11, 1984
Room A
Shoreham Hotel

TESTIMONY OF MATTHEW D. ERULKAR

TO THE

DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL PLATFORM COMMITTEE

Board Members

Neal B. Blair—Chairman
Sayed J. Houssein—President
Don Weidenweber
Abdul Madjid Zabuli
Thomas Gouttierre

Executive Director

Matthew D. Erulkar
Guerrilla Warfare Specialist
Andrew L. Eiva

Because of the issues and values that surround the Afghan situation whether they be geo-political, the moral issue of a nation facing genocide, U.S./Soviet relations, U.S./Developing Nation relations, the continuity of our foreign policy and the use of our intelligence services, the failure of the U.S. to support effectively the Afghan liberation movement must be addressed specifically in the 1984 Platform if the Democratic Party and its constituents are to display their ideals to the nation and to the world. Only then will the Democratic Party, a party traditionally identified with human rights and the struggle for self-determination of all people, be seen as a party that will not flee from issues of consequence and controversy.

The Afghans, through a heroic resistance, have now fought the Soviets to buy the Free World four years to decide whether it has the guts to come to the aid of a people who are fighting for their freedom and are facing annihilation. The Afghans have the ability to win their war of liberation, but they can also lose. The war is only a standoff.

In fact, the Soviet Army newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda in an article published January 15, 1984 stated "The Salang Road tunnel on the one major route between the Soviet Union and Kabul is used only during the day for fear of Afghan guerrilla attacks."

The Carter administration, in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan boycotted the Olympic games in Moscow, cut grain exports to the USSR, curbed high technology trade and interrupted scientific and cultural relations.

The Reagan administration, however, has concluded a major grain deal with the Soviet Union and resumed high technology trade and other relations. The Reagan administration has become involved in adventures in Central American and Lebanon that have shown no foresight, continuity or success in our foreign policy.

Regarding the Afghan issue, the level of assistance to the Afghans under the Reagan administration has been so shockingly low in quantity and poor in quality that it has killed more Afghans than Soviets. The State Dept. and the CIA have not been held accountable for this failure.

Verified reports by Americans and Europeans who have travelled into Afghanistan and to Pakistan indicate that the Afghans are receiving three types of covert support. The first type includes weapons that are unsuitable for guerrilla warfare such as the Soviet-made 82mm

medium range mortar and the SAM-7 surface to air missile. The second category of weapons include weapons that are broken or have been tampered with. Such weapons include anti-tank mines without their arming devices and mismatched demolition components for other mines. The final group includes weapons that are good but which receive so little ammunition they are out of action 95% of the time. These weapons include the 12.7mm heavy machine gun, the 14.5 mm heavy machine gun and other mortars.

Drew Middleton in a December 4, 1983 issue of the New York Times wrote, "Mr Mojadedi (leader of the moderate Afghan resistance alliance) said that he had been promised \$25 million in Western arms but received only \$6 million worth and still needed surface to air missiles such as the American-made Redeye missile."

Newsweek Persicope on December 26, 1983 stated "One guerrilla chieftain reports that of 20 Soviet-made mortar rounds he received, 11 failed to detonate and one fell short wounding his own men: none reached the Soviet target. Other rebel leaders say their Soviet-made SAM-7 anti-aircraft missiles are inaccurate..."

Sen. Tsongas (D-MA) said while talking with resistance leader Mojadedi in November, 1983, "The whole situation is crazy. I mean where do we draw the line? If we can't aid you, then who can we aid?"

On December 13, 1983, Zbigniew Brzezinski said that the United States should increase its support for the Afghan resistance fighters by supplying them with more sophisticated Western weapons instead of the Soviet-style guns they are now receiving. "Their continued reliance on Soviet-style weapons is causing them operational and logistical problems."

A resolution in the Senate and in the House addresses the problem of supporting the resistance effectively. S. Con. Res. 74 and H. Con. Res. 237 have 69 and 155 cosponsors respectively. Broken down by party, there are 128 Democratic cosponsors and 96 Republican cosponsors. The resolution calls for effective material support to the Afghan resistance on the premise that IT IS INDEFENSIBLE TO GIVE THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE ONLY ENOUGH TO FIGHT AND DIE BUT NOT ENOUGH TO ADVANCE THEIR CAUSE OF FREEDOM.

In fact, the CIA and the State Dept. are opposed to the effective material support clause in the resolution. The CIA has a terrible record of supporting liberation movements through covert paramilitary operations. Of the twelve liberation movements supported covertly since WWII: Lithuania, Albania, the Ukraine, Poland, Tibet, China, Cuba, Kurdistan twice in the 60s and 70s, the Hmong tribe in Laos, Sumatra and most recently Angola, all twelve were abandoned and all failed.

Newsweek Periscope, December 26, 1983: "Still officials in Washington do not intend to increase U.S. covert aid significantly. 'They seem to be doing very well with what they've got,' says one." There are between 750,000 and 1,500,000 dead in Afghanistan and three to four million refugees in Pakistan and Iran.

Selig Harrison quoted a high-ranking American intelligence official as saying, "Afghanistan is gone, but we will make the Russians pay by encouraging the Afghan resistance indefinitely." (Washington Post, December 29, 1983)

The Wall Street Journal, April 9, 1984, quoted Mojadedi as saying to a high-ranking American official: "You are making us die cheap." What was not reported was that the official was CIA Director William Casey and that his reply was: "There is nothing I can do."

The U.S. is failing to support effectively a people facing genocide who are trying to liberate their country. Under the present administration, only enough aid to fight and die has been supplied, not enough to advance the Afghan cause of freedom. Despite rhetoric to the contrary, the Republican Party has failed to change the situation in Afghanistan. At issue is whether the CIA and the State Dept. really desire for the situation to change. Only the Democratic Party offers new and imaginative alternatives to help the Afghans end their war. Adapting the Afghan issue as part of the 1984 Platform will increase the chances of the Democratic Party around the nation in the upcoming elections and will put the U.S. back on an honest and straight foreign policy.



Federation for American Afghan Action

TESTIMONY BEFORE GOP SUBCOMMITTEE
ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AUGUST 13, 1984

Board Members

Neal B. Blair - Chairman
Sayed J. Houssein - President
Don Weidenweber
Abdul Majid Zabuli
Thomas Goutierre

Executive Director
Andrew L. Eiva

Legislative Director
Matthew D. Erulkar

Good morning. My name is Neal Blair. As Chairman of the Federation for American Afghan Action, I represent a growing number of Americans who are demanding effective aid to the Afghan freedom fighters. We were founded only last year and have been instrumental in the introduction of three major bi-partisan congressional resolutions urging effective material aid to the Afghan resistance. In addition, we have been a driving force behind congressional pressure that has resulted in recent allocations of additional millions of dollars to the Afghan freedom fighters.

The additional allocations have been (in part) because the oft-reported \$325 million dollars already spent in the last four years by the U.S. have had minimal impact. Despite assurances from so called "knowledgeable" sources in Washington that the pipeline to the Afghan resistance is full, reports reaching us from impartial and credible American and European observers in the field indicate that the types of aid reaching those we are committed to help are inadequate and of the wrong kind. Our Afghan friends, while appreciating our support, confirmed that the aid that has reached them was for the most part useless for their tasks. Let me give you several examples.

For four years, the guerrillas have identified shoulder-fired, man-portable, and air defense missiles as their primary need. What they got was the SAM-7. What made our bureaucrats' selection of the SAM-7 for the Afghans particularly intriguing is that we have used them before in the Angola guerrilla support operation in 1976 - with nearly a 100% malfunction rate. But that hasn't kept

us from giving the same weapon to the Afghans, while turning a deaf ear to four years of anguished guerrilla reports of the missile's total ineffectiveness against Soviet gunships. The SAM-7 does have one important military result, however. It creates a thick smoke trail leading back to the guerrilla gunner and exposing him to Soviet gunship counterfire. The heavy machine gun and the medium mortar are potentially the best available weapons against armored helicopter gunships. But we have delivered both weapons to the guerrillas in a way that has totally undercut their effectiveness.

Of the numerous medium mortars available internationally, we have picked the one with the worst range and accuracy for delivery to the guerrillas. Not only does the poor range keep it from reaching most Soviet airfields, the ammunition misfire rate is known to have run over 50% and has resulted in an overall system so dangerous and unreliable that some guerrilla commanders have refused to accept any more.

Finally, the heavy machine gun we deliver to the Afghans, the Dashaka, is kept ineffective most of the time by an ammo resupply rate that averages only 600 rounds a month - an amount that limits the machine gun to several minutes of combat.

In any case, it appears if you add up all the aid the guerrillas have received, multiply by two, factor in another 100% for transportation, and double it again for good measure, it's still pretty hard to find \$325 million dollars worth of bang.

It appears the policies of this Administration and the will of the American people are being thwarted by bureaucratic inefficiency. While we who are part of the Washington scene have come to expect such inefficiency, in this case, it is indefensible for us to tolerate it for the price is too high. The price is threefold: brave Afghan blood; jeopardy to American strategic interests in the Persian Gulf; and a de-facto abandonment of our basic values as a

people.

It is past time that the American people speak loudly and with one voice for those fighting and dying for freedom. In this case, the course of what we must do is clear. It is no longer a question of aiding the Afghans. The Administration and Congress have already expressed their will. A bi-partisan resolution for effective material aid has 69 U.S. Senators and 162 House Members as co-sponsors. The Democratic party platform is on record calling for material assistance to the Afghans. The only issue is the type of aid we will provide and the means to insure that it is delivered to its intended recipients and not diverted to nefarious purposes.

Now let us review what the Afghan resistance needs to protect its people from Soviet annihilation and to convince the Soviets to negotiate their withdrawal.

To withstand the Soviet gunships, the Afghans require full support within the extent of the free world's capabilities in the following four weapons systems:

1. Shoulder-fired air defense missiles;
2. Heavy machine guns;
3. Medium mortars; and
4. Small-arms fire in air defense.

1. Shoulder-fired air defense missiles - Develop trained Afghan infrastructure to ring every Soviet airfield in Afghanistan with a section of five teams of coordinated anti-airgunners with shoulder fired air defense missiles. One thousand Stinger missile systems, supplemented with available British Blowpipes, Swedish RBS70, the French Mistral and American Redeye and Saber missiles will provide the variety to overwhelm Soviet high tech countermeasures and internationalize the support.

2. Heavy Machine Guns - Cover every populated valley in Afghanistan with four to eight heavy machine guns with interlocking fire, well-trained gunners and ample ammunition stocks. The Swiss Oerlikon 20mm, field tested in moun-

tainous terrain by Italian "Alpini" mountain troops, will provide a deadly one-shot, one-kill capacity against Soviet gunships with its armor piercing high explosive rounds. This will supplement the 12.7 mm and 14.5 mm heavy machine guns already being delivered to the Afghans.

3. Medium Mortars - Deliver and develop a medium mortar capability to place 50% of the Soviet airfields under fire during the day and 100% of Soviet airfields under fire at night. Although neither the American nor Soviet medium mortars have the necessary range, Singapore, France, Israel, Finland, and Denmark all produce medium mortars with the 6,000 meter range needed.

4. Small Arms Fire in Air Defense (SAFAD) - Train the guerrillas to increase their rifles' effectiveness against vulnerable spots of helicopter gunships by a factor of five by the use of cheap target drones.

Although no single weapon of those mentioned above will defeat Soviet airpower by itself, the full-fledged integration of all of them will interrupt the on-going annihilation of Afghanistan.

There are those who argue that to support the Afghans visibly with arms could provoke superpower confrontation. These same voices overlook that the Soviets have openly supported national liberation movements throughout Africa, the Middle East, and Vietnam where bullets made in Moscow were fired at American boys. Have we forgotten that the Soviets provided the North Vietnamese with the most lethal air defense network in history, an air defense network that knocked down thousands of our planes and killed thousands of American pilots and crewmen? In Afghanistan, the Soviet aggression has been condemned in every forum. The UN, the third world, and even several communist parties condemn the legitimacy of the brutal invasion of this Moslem nation. There is no place in the world where the values of self-determination are more clearly underlined. For us to abandon this brave people behind a veil of bureaucratic platitudes and toothless endorsements will put us in jeopardy for the future. The free world is now being tested with increasing frequency and growing audacity by

the forces of totalitarianism. The first line of defense is our values, backed by a capacity to wage irregular warfare in the defense of those values. History will not forgive us if we do not firmly support with physical means required for the Afghans to maintain their dignity and their freedom.

The President, 65 Republican Representatives and 35 Republican Senators have already expressed a firm commitment to helping the Afghan cause. It is now time for the Republican party to take the lead to champion the cause of freedom, the cause of the Afghan people, the cause of effective material assistance to thwart the design of aggressors.



Federation for American Afghan Action

Executive Director
Andrew L. Eiva

May 15, 1986

Board Members

Neal B. Blair—Chairman
Sayed J. Houssein—President
Don Weidenweber
Abdul Madjid Zabuli
Thomas Goutierre

Situation: Five members of the Stanton group have already signed up as members of the CIA accountability coalition based on the previous discussion. The following goals are the written fruition of the previous discussion of the Stanton group.

Stanton Action Item:

For those Stanton members who needed a written format of the result of our discussions before making a decision to join, the following listing of goals is provided.

Goals of the CIA accountability coalition

Overall goal: Victorious implementation of effective aid to legitimate resistance movements.

Intermediate goals for 1986:

A. tougher accountability by congress over CIA performance in terms of effectiveness, to include leverage over the budget process. This will consist of analysis of CIA performance in terms of the key success factors of supporting resistance movements. *and then show the results*

B. Political power to back consideration of alternatives to the CIA's director of operations in supporting resistance movements; Pentagon, or a Private Volunteer Organization are possibilities. *Sanitise bill*

C. Increase the flow of effective feed back to the Executive branch through leveraged meetings and media. *Constituting*

D. Mobilize efforts for overt aid whenever the opportunity presents itself. *Fiskilau*

E. Creation of a centralized Afghan office at the Pentagon or the White House which would figure out what it takes to carry out the Afghan policy and then implement it. This is the only issue that now enjoys bipartisan support and will continue to open the way for other resistance movements as the issue evolves. *Congress to Abrams*

F. Injection of effective freedom fighter aid. *issue into Congressional campaigns of 1986 in a non-partisan way.*

Dole, Bush, Kemp → Armstrong

Federation for American Afghan Action

Founding Board Members

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President

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Chairman

Andrew L. Eiva
Executive Director

STANTON ACTION ITEM

MAY 3, 1984

Current Situation in the Senate: Although 67 Senators are already cosponsoring Senate Concurrent Resolution 74, recent State Department and CIA resistance have been making the Senate Foreign Relations hesitate in bringing it to the floor.

What is Needed: Help from the following conservatives (CSFC ratings greater than 70%) who are needed as cosponsors

Roth	Hawkins
Goldwater	Tribble
Stevens	Domenici
Baker	
Tower	
Himphrey	
Helms	

What Difference it Will Make: The addition of the above Senators will push the cosponsor total over 80%, approaching a Tonkin-level consensus to override executive branch resistance.

Key Phrases of Resolution drafted to galvanize bipartisan consensus for effective action:

Whereas it would be indefensible to provide the freedom fighters with only enough aid to fight and die but not enough to advance their cause of freedom.

...To provide the people of Afghanistan, if they so request, with material assistance, as the United States considers appropriate, to help them effectively fight for their freedom.

What the Opposition Says: Senator Mathias, floor managing the opposition in the Senate, denounce the resolution on November 15th, during the first markup session on the legislation, "This resolution represents a blank check for unlimited military assistance to Afghanistan, be it overt or covert."

Federation for American Afghan Action

Founding Board Members

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President

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Chairman

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Executive Director

SAMPLE DEAR COLLEAGUE

Dear House Democrat:

As reported in today's Washington Post, this week's massive Soviet strategic bombing of Afghanistan represents a new escalation in the campaign of mass terror against the Afghan nation. For four years, the Afghan liberation movement has stood off the onslaught of the world's number one land power with almost non-existent outside support in a triumphant miracle of the heroic human spirit. The time has come for an unequivocal congressional commitment for effective support to this legitimate liberation movement.

Democratic Congressmen have traditionally led the way as the most credible exponents of the human rights principles in American foreign policy. These human rights principles are the core of America's moral leadership. These principles will ultimately determine our strength, our power, and our survival.

By maintaining the Democratic lead on the Afghan issue, your cosponsorship will insure that American support of this legitimate liberation movement evolves in a way that reflects our human rights ideals.

Enclosure: List of the 84 Democratic House cosponsors

Federation for American Afghan Action

Founding Board Members

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President

Neal Blair
Chairman

Andrew L. Eiva
Executive Director

STANTON GROUP ACTION ITEM

Subject: Effective Aid to Afghan Resistance

Status of Current Hardware Deliveries to the Afghan Resistance: The arms now being delivered fall into three ineffective categories 1) Weapons of such poor quality that they are killing more Afghans than Soviets 2) Good quality weapons that have been tampered and delivered in inoperable condition 3) Good quality weapons for which the ammunition supply is so low as to render them inoperable over 90% of the time.

Current Political Situation in the Senate: Senator Paul Tsongas has decided to proceed with the legislation and has rejected attempts by executive branch agencies to water it down or eliminate it altogether. Senators Baker, Mathias, and Hatfield are the only clearly identified opponents on the floor so far.

What is Needed: Cosponsorship by 12 more of the Senators listed below of Senate Concurrent Resolution 74, the effective material assistance resolution

Conservatives

William Roth
Barry Goldwater
Ted Stevens
Howard Baker
John Tower
Gordon Humphrey
Jesse Helms
Paula Hawkins
John East
Paul Tribble
Pete Domenici

Others

Joseph Biden
Patrick Leahy
Sam Nunn
Bennett Johnson
Charles Mathias
John Chafee
Mark Hatfield
Howard Metzenbaum
George Mitchell
Quentin Burdick
Lowell Weicker
Slade Gorton
Russell Long
Frank Lautenberg
Max Baucus
~~Spark Matsunaga~~
David Boren
Bob Packwood
Robert Stafford
John Danforth
Dan Evans

What Difference it Will Make: insulate the legislation against any last minute attempts to derail between now and passage.

Points of Contact: Federation for American Afghan Action telephone listed below and Chris Chamberlin is handling sign-up in Sen. Tsongas's office 2241128.

III. 29 Feb 84

C 2

AFGHANISTAN

Foreign Broadcast Information Service

Radio Kabul

BAKHTAR: U.S. To Step Up Anti-Afghan Campaign
LD261256 Kabul BAKHTAR in English 0421 GMT 26 Feb 84

[Text] Kabul, February 25, BAKHTAR — The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is examining a resolution on rendering aid to "Afghan freedom fighters," as the Afghan counter-revolutionary rabble are called in the USA. If the resolution is approved by both chambers of the US Congress, the *WASHINGTON POST* noted recently, the Reagan administration will have the right to render open assistance to Afghan cutthroats.

Washington has been organizing, financing and guiding the undeclared war against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan for the sixth year running. The White House has never concealed that it is engaged in "secret operations" against the Afghan republic for which the CIA spends annually 100 million dollars. The bulk of these funds goes for purchasing weapons for counter-revolutionary gangs and for training terrorists at special camps in Pakistan. However, US efforts aimed at undermining the gains of the April Revolution have failed. The discussion of the question on legalizing the aid to counter-revolutionary detachments shows that Washington is ready to step up subversive activities against Afghanistan. The open support of Afghan cutthroats may become a new stage of the US undeclared war against the Afghan people. The adoption of the resolution will give freedom to the Reagan administration which already turned its close cooperation with counterrevolutionaries in Asia, Africa and Latin America into a principal element of its foreign policy.

Senator Mathias during the Senate Foreign Relations Committee mark-up on November 15th, 1983, while voicing his objections as he blocked expeditious movement of the legislation to the floor:

"This resolution (S.Con.Res.74) represents nothing less than a blank check for unlimited military assistance to the Afghans, be it covert or overt."



Checklist of Upcoming Issues

National Security Record (Heritage) 3/84

Aid for Afghan Freedom Fighters: As the Soviet Union shows signs of initiating a new spring offensive in this fifth year of its occupation of Afghanistan, the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and Senator Charles Mathias (R-Md) continue to oppose congressional efforts to press the government to do more to help the Afghan resistance movement. Senator Paul Tsongas (D-Mass) is trying to move a bipartisan resolution calling on the United States to provide effective material assistance to the freedom fighters. The Senate resolution has 61 co-sponsors, but thus far Senator Mathias has blocked it. With the current level of assistance to the Afghan freedom fighters reported to be grossly inadequate, congressional impatience with the State/CIA desire not to antagonize the Soviets or the Pakistanis is growing. An effort reportedly will be made to move the congressional resolution by the end of April.

SFRC Staff Supports Mondale Position: In late February the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee issued a report endorsing the "walk in the woods" formula as a basis for a return to the arms control talks on missiles in Europe. That formula was worked out by the chief U.S. and Soviet negotiators in a series of unofficial discussions they had in the Swiss countryside in 1982. Both Washington and Moscow rejected the formula, which would have limited the Soviets to 75 SS-20 ballistic missile launchers targeted on Western Europe and the West to 75 cruise missile launchers in Europe. After listening to the arguments, President Reagan decided in September 1982 to reject the formula, which would have prohibited the deployment to Europe of any Pershing II missiles, the Europe-based weapon the Soviets fear the most.

Capitol Hill and Administration supporters of a firm U.S. arms control posture are bitter that Republican Senator Charles Percy, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, would permit the committee staff to issue a report supporting an idea that has been rejected by President Reagan but endorsed by Democratic front-runner Walter Mondale. Mr. Mondale has proposed a unilateral moratorium on the further deployment of Pershing IIs to try to induce the Soviets to accept the rejected "walk in the woods" formula.

Export Control Legislation: Expected Senate passage of the Garn/Heinz export control bill will lead to an important conference committee with a very dissimilar House-passed bill. Although concerned with the same subject, the two bills proceed in opposite directions. The Senate bill modestly strengthens controls over the export of high technology to the Soviet Union and other east bloc countries, but the House bill actually liberalizes such restrictions. Most experts agree that advanced technology from the U.S. and other Western powers has significantly augmented Soviet military capabilities.

Among other things, the Senate bill would give the Customs Service more authority to control exports and strengthen the role of the Pentagon in the export control process. This ultimately would restrict Soviet advances in military technology. But House liberals, who have led criticism of American military programs to meet the growing Soviet threat, appear unwilling to limit technological aid to Moscow's military machine. Thus, the thrust of the House bill is to promote U.S.

exports, but without adequate controls on the flow of sophisticated equipment to Soviet-bloc countries. The differences between the two bills will be resolved in the House-Senate conference. Senator Garn is expected to stand firm for tougher controls and indicates he will seek to block any loosening of restrictions.

Elections and Violence in El Salvador: As the March 25 presidential election in El Salvador approaches, the Salvadoran government appears able to thwart any major guerrilla offensive that might be mounted to disrupt the voting, but it can do little to control random acts of violence. The population has fled most areas controlled by the guerrillas and thus will be able to vote in government held territory. Nevertheless, the Marxist guerrillas are expected to use violence to try to disrupt the elections. While guerrilla leaders state they will urge a boycott of the elections, they have not publicly called for violence to disrupt them as this generated adverse publicity for them two years ago. But it is clear that they are already using violence against political leaders. In January they assassinated an ASEAN assemblyman in San Salvador and further attempts at political murders are expected. Salvadoran observers look for the guerrillas to try to make their assassinations appear to be the work of "death squads," in order to disrupt the elections and in the process to discredit both the Salvadoran government and the Reagan Administration.

U.S. Setback in Namibia/Angola? U.S. discussions with Angola in Cape Verde in January led to talks with South Africa that have resulted in an agreement concerning the withdrawal of South African forces from Angola. In exchange for this withdrawal, the MPLA regime in Luanda will prevent SWAPO from exploiting the situation by rebuilding their forces in southern Angola. This is seen as a first step toward a broader agreement between South Africa and Angola that could peaceably resolve the conflict in Namibia under the framework of United Nations Resolution 435. A State Department briefing on the situation appeared to indicate flexibility in the U.S. requirement that Cuban forces withdraw from Angola parallel to any South African withdrawal from Namibia. State has indicated that the nine-month withdrawal period in U.N. resolution 435 could accommodate South African withdrawals during the early part of this transition period followed by Cuban withdrawals later in the period.

During the transition period the nationalist UNITA forces in Angola may be jeopardized if their supplies from South Africa are terminated at a time when Cuban and MPLA forces can launch joint operations against them. Thus, fears exist that there will be an "indecent interval" between South African and Cuban withdrawals from the area. Without a parallel withdrawal of forces, many experts are concerned that the proposed settlement of the Namibia conflict would mean a fortified MPLA regime in Angola (officially recognized by Washington), a Marxist SWAPO regime in Windhoek, and a large bill for foreign aid to Namibia that South Africa would gladly pass on to the U.S. and other Western powers.



Shultz with refugees: an air of pessimism.

AFGHANISTAN

New year irresolution

The Reagan administration hails the Afghan resistance, but offers it only limited arms so as not to provoke Moscow

By Nayan Chanda in Washington

The observance of the traditional Afghan New Year on 21 March provided United States President Ronald Reagan's administration an occasion to express its "admiration for the bravery and heroism of the Afghan people" against the Soviet invaders and repeat what Secretary of State George Shultz told Afghan refugees last July: "We are with you . . . I share your confidence that in the end freedom will prevail, we will prevail." But behind the rhetoric there is a growing pessimism about the fate of Afghanistan.

While the Reagan administration draws satisfaction from the international discomfiture of the Soviets and the drain on manpower and resources resulting from the occupation of Afghanistan, it does not entertain any illusion about the guerillas forcing out the invaders. Privately, officials are also pessimistic about a negotiated Soviet withdrawal and the self-determination of the Afghan people. As Diego Cordovez, the United Nations undersecretary-general for special affairs, left New York on 30 March for another round of consultations with Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan to find a solution to the Afghan problem, administration sources predicted another failure.

"Moscow, surely, does not like the losses and the bad publicity but I just don't see them going home abandoning their strategic bases," said one official.

State Department officials strongly deny the suggestion that Washington has held Pakistan back from a

negotiated settlement on Soviet withdrawal in order to bleed the Soviets. A number of knowledgeable diplomats and congressional sources also discount the suggestion of deliberate US sabotage.

It would seem logical for the staunchly anti-Soviet Reagan administration to wish to punish the Soviets for their adventure, said a diplomatic observer, but it would not cut off its own nose to spite the Soviets' face. For the administration it is more important to get the Soviets out of Afghanistan than to bleed them, and there is no indication so far that they are serious about withdrawal.

While there is debate over why Cordovez and the parties to the Geneva talks were so optimistic about a settlement last April, most sources agree that the reason nothing came out of it was the Soviet refusal to provide a timetable for withdrawal. Either the Soviets deliberately misled Cordovez or there was imperfect understanding as to how the Soviets wanted to settle the Afghan problem.

Informed sources said that when Pakistani Foreign Minister Shabazada Yaqub Khan sat down for the first direct talks with his Soviet counterpart Andrei Gromyko in May 1983, it became clear that Moscow expected Pakistan to deal directly with Afghan President Babrak Karmal's regime and stop aiding the resistance before the Soviets would consider withdrawing troops or committing itself to a timetable.

It was this realisation, rather than US advice, that seems to have led Pakistan to pull back. Pakistani sources said that another reason for their unwillingness to accept the Afghan pledge of non-interference and non-intervention was the latter's refusal to accept the Durand Line as the border between the two countries. "If the border line is not recognised," said a Pakistani official, "what is the value of such a [non-intervention] pledge? Intervention, after all, has to be across an international border."

There are different views among official analysts as to the motive behind the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan — from the traditional Russian drive for warm waters, ambition to control the Gulf of Hormuz to the more limited goal of keeping a strategically located neighbour out of unfriendly hands. But one unanimous view is that the Soviet Union is determined to have a subversive regime in Afghanistan that would allow it to maintain its strategic airbases.

Official sources privately say that while the US would go along with any agreement on Soviet troop withdrawal that Pakistan is comfortable with, it cannot accept a situation in which Moscow gains a permanent strategic hold in Afghanistan — a position that could prove crucial in determining the future of Pakistan, Iran and the whole Gulf region. This broader US concern explains its unspoken difference with Pakistan over political arrangements in Afghanistan.

While Pakistan has put on the record its readiness to deal with a pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan as long as it is not that of Karmal, Washington insists on self-determination. The US is certain that in case of a free choice anti-communist Afghans will hold sway. However, Washington's dilemma is that its clear view of the desirable in Afghanistan is not matched by equally clear policy options. "Short of launching World War III," said one official, "we don't see any way of forcing the Russians out of Afghanistan." The only alternative to accepting the Soviet occupation is to make it costly by helping the resistance.

Since early 1980 the US has been clandestinely supplying the guerillas with Soviet weapons obtained from Egypt and other countries. But the quality and quantity of weaponry has been carefully balanced in order not to provoke the Soviets. Officials refuse to discuss the question of arms supply. But informed sources say that despite pressure from some quarters to increase the cost of Soviet occupation by giving sophisticated anti-aircraft weapons to the guerillas the administration has stuck to the cautious path of providing a small amount of Soviet-made SAM7 hand-held anti-aircraft missiles.

Apart from the fear of provoking the Soviets into strikes inside Pakistan

such as the January bombing of a border market which caused 45 deaths, a practical consideration has been the disunity of the resistance.

A State Department report on Afghanistan in December last year noted that "the resistance is still plagued by internal divisions and factional fighting" and that "progress towards organisational and logistical coordination is slowed by serious territorial and ideological rivalries."

In such a situation, sources explained, the handing over of sophisticated anti-aircraft weapons to one or other group could pose serious problems of control and training. There is also a danger of such weapons falling into hostile hands.

But arguments like this do not seem to have persuaded Republican Congressman Don Ritter who has introduced legislation calling for US material assistance to the Afghan resistance. Ritter, who has been in touch with members of the Afghan resistance, said that without effective support from the US and other Western nations, Afghanistan as a nation is going to disappear.

In addition, he says the Soviet air-bases in southwest Afghanistan "present an unacceptable threat to the Hormuz oil passage lanes which are so vital to the free world economies." The fact that the Afghans are fighting for their independence presents Washington with a good opportunity "to give the Russians a real run for their money," Ritter said in an interview. He wants the administration to adopt a liberal policy of giving asylum to the defectors from the Soviet army in Afghanistan and effective weaponry to the resistance.

Sources say that administration officials as well as the Pakistani ambassador have tried unsuccessfully to dissuade the congressman from pushing the resolution. A resolution like this, passed by congress, would not be binding on the administration. But officials fear that it would bring unnecessary public attention to the limited covert action now taking place and give propaganda advantage to the Soviets.

A resolution calling for material aid to the resistance, a State Department official said, could also raise false hopes and bring demoralisation. But Ritter said that the resolution, if adopted by a bipartisan vote, would actually help the administration in its search for a political settlement by sending a clear signal to Moscow about the seriousness of American concern.

The resolution, introduced in the US Senate by Democratic Sen. Paul Tsongas, has already got 56 co-sponsors and Ritter himself has got 130 co-sponsors in the House of Representatives. He expects both houses to pass the resolution before May.

Cordovez starts over

Indirect talks get under way again as the conflict in the country intensifies and hopes for a settlement fade

By Romey Fullerton in Islamabad

United Nations special envoy to Afghanistan Diego Cordovez is once again engaged in a round of consultations with Pakistan, the Soviet-backed Kabul regime and Iran in search of a political resolution to the conflict in Afghanistan.

In the first weeks of April he was visiting Teheran, Kabul and Islamabad, spending two days in each capital. Cordovez will wait until after the tour to decide whether to stay on in the region to pursue the initiative further, according to diplomatic sources.

His attempt to bring the participants back to negotiation after the collapse of the so-called proximity talks in Geneva last year has been called (quoting George Bernard Shaw) "a triumph of hope over experience." Shaw was discussing second marriage, but in this case even those most intimately involved show little enthusiasm for the process.

Progress at the beginning of last year led Cordovez to claim that the indirect talks had achieved 95% of an agreement. But by the end of the year the talks broke down over failure to agree on a clear timetable for the withdrawal of Soviet troops. According to diplomatic sources, Islamabad insisted on a time-frame of three months but the Soviet-backed Kabul regime would not come below 18 months. In return for the Soviet withdrawal Pakistan was required by Kabul to seal its borders to guerilla movement and supplies.

Since that time positions have hardened even further. When Pakistan's President Zia-ul-Haq visited Moscow in February for the funeral of Soviet president Yuri Andropov, his requests to meet the successor as party secretary, Konstantin Chernenko were spurned. Many had seen Zia's lengthy interview with Andropov 14 months earlier at the funeral of Leonid Brezhnev as a signal of hope for the talks. Andropov had greeted Kabul's President Babrak Karmal cursorily. Zia returned to Pakistan elated. "The Soviets have indicated their willingness to leave Afghanistan," he said. "I think we should take them at their word." But this time Chernenko gave Zia the cold shoulder and granted a long audience to Karmal.

The Kabul government has now resumed its pressure for direct talks with Pakistan. Islamabad, however, refuses on the grounds that this would amount to recognising an illegitimate, Soviet-installed regime. It had taken two years of careful negotiation after the Soviet intervention in December 1979 to find a way round this problem before talks could begin at all.

Kabul's official figures show a total of 4.5 million Afghans have fled their country since the communist takeover to take refuge in Pakistan and Iran. Karmal has been playing on the difficulties that the burden of accommodating such large numbers of refugees imposes on the indigenous populations. In his speech on 21 March (the Afghan New Year) Karmal said he was confident that "our brothers in

Pakistan and Iran... will eventually force their governments to review their present policies towards the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan."

Iran has adopted such stringent measures to control the country's Afghan refugee community that thousands have left Iranian soil for Pakistan. When the authorities in Pakistan moved some refugees away from the overcrowded border provinces of North

West Frontier and Baluchistan into the Punjab, there was a spate of articles in the local press calling for a negotiated settlement even if that did mean recognising the Kabul regime. Pakistan, however, has little room for manoeuvre, since it cannot afford to alienate its Islamic and Western allies.

While Iran may be hard on refugees, it shows no sign of returning to the talks which it left to protest against the lack of representation of the Afghan resistance. Teheran now wishes only to be informed of developments, and foreign diplomats have been told by Soviet officials that Kabul will not change its stand. Since neither Islamabad nor Kabul wishes to be seen to be uncooperative, both publicly expressed the desire for the UN-sponsored talks to continue.

Other factors work against progress towards a peaceful solution to the problems of Afghanistan. In February the Soviet ambassador to Pakistan claimed the Soviets were well on



Cordovez: a triumph of hope.

U.S. Is Cautious in Aiding Afghan Rebels

WSJ Apr 9 '84 pg 38

By DAVID IGNATIUS

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON—Sibghatullah Mojadedi, a leader of the Moslem resistance movement in Afghanistan, met here in November with a senior Reagan administration official. After pleading for more covert aid from the U.S., the rebel leader is said to have exclaimed: "You're making us die too cheap!"

The resistance leader's frustration is understandable. While the U.S. is providing rhetorical support for the anti-Soviet guerrillas—and small secret shipments of weapons—the Reagan administration has deliberately avoided making any large commitment to them.

The main reason for the restrained American aid, U.S. officials say, is that the U.S. doesn't want to provoke the Soviets into attacking Pakistan, where most of the Afghan resistance groups have their headquarters. "If we escalate, then the Soviets go after the Pakistanis," explains one U.S. official.

Moslems 'Won't Win'

The result is probably a continuing war of attrition in Afghanistan, U.S. officials say. "The professionals say (the Moslem rebels) aren't going to win," says one U.S. intelligence source. "The most we can do is give them incremental increases in aid and raise the costs to the Soviets."

A U.S. intelligence source says that covert American aid to the Afghan rebels currently totals about \$80 million annually. The aid level has risen gradually since the Carter administration requested about \$30 million in January 1980, just one month after the Soviets invaded and installed a new leader, Babrak Karmal, to bolster a tottering Marxist regime.

The war in Afghanistan receives little attention in the American news media and Congress. That could change slightly this

week with the publication of a Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff report on the war, written by John Ritch, a committee aide. Mr. Ritch traveled into Afghanistan with the rebels in February, and is probably the first U.S. official to openly visit the resistance inside the country.

Mr. Ritch's report argues for stronger U.S. support of the Afghan resistance. He



makes three recommendations: U.S. aid to the rebels should be coordinated closely with Moslem countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt; the U.S. should recognize an Afghan government-in-exile if the guerrilla groups can unite; and the U.S. should help establish an "underground railroad" to the West for Soviet soldiers captured by the resistance.

Interview Soviet Soldiers

Mr. Ritch talked with 14 Soviet soldiers who were being held prisoner by the rebels, five of them in the Pakistan border area and nine near Kandahar, a city in southern Afghanistan. He writes: "All of the prisoners were deeply disillusioned, and had little idea what they were fighting for in Afghanistan. . . . Together they portrayed a Red Army that has low morale and poor training and is ineffective in com-

bat." He contends that for humanitarian and propaganda reasons, the U.S. should help these prisoners escape to the West.

The Reagan administration's dilemma in dealing with the war in Afghanistan is this: What's good for the resistance there could be bad for Pakistan, an important U.S. ally.

Pakistan provides important sanctuary for the resistance groups in the border areas near Peshawar. To bolster Pakistan's defenses against any Soviet incursion, the Reagan administration is providing a five-year, \$3.2 billion military aid program. In recent months, the Soviets have warned that the Red Army might carry the war across the border if the U.S. and Pakistan don't curb their support for the rebels.

U.S. officials say that this year's \$80 million covert aid program for the Afghan resistance includes guns, ammunition and other military equipment, as well as training inside Pakistan. To mask American involvement, the U.S. generally provides only Soviet-type weapons. U.S. policy also precludes any American advisers or trainers inside Afghanistan. "We train the trainers," says one official.

U.S. Supplies Missiles

The U.S. provides Soviet-designed SAM-7 shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles, which the guerrillas say they need badly. But sources say the U.S. has decided against providing large numbers of anti-tank weapons, such as rocket-propelled grenades, on the theory that the resistance fighters would have difficulty using them effectively.

Aid to the Afghan rebel groups also comes from China and Egypt, which also provide Soviet-type weapons, and from Saudi Arabia, which offers about the same value of support that the U.S. does.

Andrew Riva, a former U.S. Army Special Forces soldier who heads a pro-rebel, large lobbying group here, complains that the U.S. isn't providing the weapons and ammunition that the guerrillas need.

Mr. Riva claims, for example, that 45% of the ammunition received by one guerrilla group for 82-mm mortars hasn't functioned properly; he also contends that several groups received only 2,400 rounds of ammunition for each of their heavy-caliber machine guns over about five months, an amount he says is only enough for a few skirmishes.

More Weapons Needed

During his travels with one of the resistance groups, Mr. Riva compiled an inventory of the weapons that he says the group obtained from 1982 through July 1983. He says the group received 7,417 bolt-action rifles; 2,940 automatic rifles; 18 82-mm mortars; 445 rocket launchers; and 127 machine guns.

Mr. Riva says the groups have a few SAM-7 anti-aircraft missiles—he counted only 28 in 1982—but not enough to threaten Soviet aircraft. He argues that the resistance needs more and better weapons, and more ammunition for what they have.

But most U.S. officials argue that the guerrillas' biggest problem isn't lack of weapons, but internal feuding. Mr. Ritch counts a total of 10 groups, including seven in a fundamentalist-Moslem alliance and three in a moderate alliance. U.S. officials say these groups spend much of their time fighting each other.

Mr. Ritch contends that the U.S. might be able to get the groups to unite if it promised to recognize a unified government-in-exile. But other officials argue that the Pakistanis might oppose such a move, since it would increase the risk of Soviet retaliation.



اتحاد اسلامي مجاهدين افغانستان

Islamic Unity of Afghanistan Mujahideen

M. Nabi Salehi
Resident Representative
October 31, 1985

The war in Afghanistan is no longer a battle of one armed force against another. It is the systematic technological destruction of an entire population by the army of a superpower. We are trying to fight a war against the most powerful army in the world, the Soviet Army. They have all the resources of a modern army, including jet fighters, helicopters armed with machine guns, radar, and so forth, even biological and chemical agents.

The Soviets, during six years of their invasion, have continuously bombed, rocketed and shelled the Afghan villages and towns throughout the country. They have burned the crops. They have cut down the fruit-bearing trees. They are killing the livestock. They are disrupting the vital irrigation systems and have poisoned the water supplies in many villages. They have used land mines and butterfly bombs to attack the native human and animal populations. They have killed more than a million Afghans. About a million Afghans are made widows and orphans. An estimated 60,000 Afghans have lost limbs and arms to the land mines. Many of them are children who thought these mines were toys.

The Afghan freedom fighters, the Mujahideen fight against the Soviet occupiers with outdated arms, supplemented with captured Soviet weapons. Time is running out. Hundreds of Afghans die daily. If our nation is to be free, we should be supported. We need modern weapons and ammunition. We need mine detectors. We need anti-tank rockets. We need missiles, the ones that could be easily carried on shoulders, something like stingers, reedies or red-eyes, to defend ourselves against the Soviet mig fighters and armored helicopter gunships.

Here, in the United States, we hear that arms are being sent to the Afghan freedom fighters. But our freedom fighters say they do not receive these arms. They complain that they have no access to modern weapons. With the heavy machine guns and little ammunition they cannot defend themselves against the mig fighters and armored helicopters.

Time is now or never for effective aid to the Afghan people. There are only so many people the Soviets can kill before there is nothing left of our country.



Federation for American Afghan Action

FROM: Andrew Eiva
Executive Director of the Federation for
American Afghan Action

Board Members

Neal B. Blair—Chairman
Sayed J. Houssein—President
Don Weidenweber
Abdul Madjid Zabuli
Thomas Gouttierre

PURPOSE: To Coordinate nationwide grass-roots pressure on Congress to correct disastrously ineffective U.S. aid to the Afghan guerrillas

Executive Director
Andrew L. Eiva
Legislative Director
Matthew D. Erulkar

FOR: Americans hoping to increase the level of free world aid reaching the Afghan guerrillas, which is now only enough to condemn them to a slow death.

EFFECTIVE DATE: September 6, 1984 thru October 4, 1984

ACTION NEEDED: Concerned Americans requesting their congressmen to cosponsor the Tsongas-Ritter material assistance resolution and to pressure Foreign Affairs Committee members to get the resolution to a vote before October 4th.

THE GOAL: The material assistance resolution, Senate Concurrent Resolution 74 (S. Con. Res. 74 or H. Con. Res. 237) focuses on the key issue; "It would be indefensible to give the Afghan freedom fighters only enough to fight and die but not enough to advance their cause of freedom." Both legislative and guerilla warfare experts have participated in drafting the resolution to form an effective legislative battleground, on which to array political pressure to initiate effective aid to the Afghan resistance.

WHAT AID IS REACHING THE AFGHANS NOW? The pathetic aid the Central Intelligence Agency's Directorate of Operations is now sending the Afghans is an insult to a heroic people facing genocide. (Details in enclosed newsletter headlined "Where's the Beef," page 1 of issue 2 of Afghan International Update).

WHY ARE BUREAUCRATS FROM THE STATE DEPARTMENT, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, AND OTHER AGENCIES PRESSURING CONGRESS TO LEAVE THEM FREE TO CONTINUE TO SENT OUTRAGEOUSLY INEFFECTIVE AID TO THE AFGHANS? The United States has not supported a guerrilla movement effectively since World War II and has lost 12 in a row. Our bureaucrats are refusing to support the Afghans effectively. The reasons why are detailed in Andrew Eiva's testimony delivered to the National Security Committee of the Republican Platform Committee during the Republican National Convention in Dallas (enclosed)

WHAT IS NEEDED: 69 Senators and 165 Representatives have already cosponsored the legislation (almost 1/2 of the entire Congress) but a concerted effort by bureaucrats from the State Department, Central Intelligence Agency and other agencies to kill the legislation has stalled the resolution in committee. To win an all out grass roots effort is necessary to insure that Congress does not cave in to the bureaucrats.

METHOD OF IMPLEMENTATION

1. Targeting Congressmen. Getting the resolution to a vote will require two types of actions:

Type 1 - Members of Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committee. These congressmen have the ability to get action in committee on this issue and are marked with arrows on the enclosed lists. Get a commitment for action in committee on the resolution from them and let us know immediately so we can check on them to insure they are fulfilling their promise to you.

Type 2 - All congressmen who are not cosponsors. Their names do not have a line through them on the enclosed list. Once you get a commitment from them to cosponsor, let us know so we can immediately check to insure they fulfill their commitment to you. These checks by you are now critical because many of the congressmen not yet cosponsoring the resolution will only respond to your request if they know we are checking on your behalf.

2. Reaching the Congressman:

- A) Telephone - All congressional offices in Washington can best be reached by dialing 1-202-224-3121 and asking the capitol operator to connect you with Senator or Representative _____'s office, which will take 3 to 5 seconds. Congressional offices are open 9:30 to 5:30. Thus they are reachable at lower rates 5:00 to 5:30 eastern Standard Time, 7:30 to 8:00 Rocky Mountain Time, and 6:30 to 8:00 Pacific Time.
- B) Local Office Visit and/or Telephone Call - A call or visit to your local office will not be redundant, but will increase your total impact. A Massachusetts citizens' delegation visiting Kennedy's office in Boston last year was instrumental in getting his important support. If you call make sure you write down the name of the individual to hold his feet to the fire later.
- C) Letters - In a short-term effort such as this one, letters are not worth as much as a phone call, but are better than nothing.
- D) Petitions - Motivated non-citizens have collected petitions in stores, cabs, and restaurants. A delegation of Marylanders brought 150 signatures to Senator Mathias' office on January 30 and gained 45 minutes of access to state their case in his office as a result.

- E) Whom to Talk To- Unless you have direct access to your congressman, which is best, go to the foreign relations aide.

3. What to Say or Write: Because you are his boss, the congressman or his office is responsible to give you an answer whether he is cosponsoring the resolution and if not, why not. It is often helpful to let him know what congressmen of his state and his party have already cosponsored the resolution. All Senators received a Dear Colleague letter from Senator Paul Tsongas, with a text of the resolution in June and Dear Colleague Letters from Congressman Don Ritter in September and October. Do not hang up without getting at least a commitment to get the answer for you. Refer to the Afghan Material Assistance S. Con. Res 74 for Senators, or H. Con. Res. 237 for Representatives.

4. Congressional Points-of-Contact. Although the Congressmen should already know this, sometimes they do not know whom to call up to sign on or to get copies of the resolution. For Democrats in the House, Celia Boddington in Congressman Lantos' office should be contacted at 225-3531. Republicans in the House should contact WENDY LEVITT in Congressman DON RITTER'S office, at 225-6411. In the Senate, Chris Chamberlian in Senator Tsongas's office can be reached at 224-1128.

5. Meaningless Answers Congressmen Will Try to Snow you With. During the past two years, some congressmen have given answers such as the following to avoid making serious commitment to help the Afghans.

<u>When They Say</u>	<u>.....It means</u>
I will vote for it when it comes up.	' Because few congressmen have the nerve to vote ' against aiding the guerrillas, the vote will be ' easy to win. This congressman is giving you ' a meaningless promise to duck the necessity of ' having to take the meaningful action you want. ' Come right back after him to squeeze him for ' an answer.
I am actively considering it, I have voted for it already, I have always supported free Afghans.	' I am not planning to do anything about it until ' you check up on me again. ' '

6. Washington Coordination Point. Federation for American Afghan Action will be operational approximately 20 hours a day, and will have available: updates on your congressmen and new developments. Our telephone number is 202/547-0202, however we are also reachable via 547-0201 located in the same suite.


7. Actions After October 4th but before the election on November 6th.

- A) The Congressman's Public Speaking Appearances. If the Congressman failed to come through on the legislation, ask him why in front of other voters when he is speaking/campaigning in your district. If he has helped, take the opportunity to publicly thank him and tell him even a stronger effort will be needed next year.


- B) The Congressman's Opponent - ask his opponent in public forum if he will support the Afghans better than your current congressman.
- C) In general, do everything to keep Afghanistan, from being buried during the campaign by keeping the issue alive in all public forums.

8. Action After November 6th. A lame duck session is possible during early December which will give us another chance if the resolution is not yet passed we will need your help during this phase. During the lame duck session in 1982 in the Senate, the CIA's Pakistan secret service friends kidnapped me and kept me incommunicado in jail in Pakistan while the bureaucrats combined with Senator Mathias to kill the legislation in spite of 99 (!) Senate cosponsors. Your vigilance will prevent equivalent chicanery from being successful in a lame duck session in 1984.

Thank you for your support,



Andrew L. Eiva
Executive Director



Matthew D. Erulkar
Legislative Director

NAMES CROSSED OFF ARE COSPONSORS; NAMES WITH
AN ARROW (>) NEXT TO THEM ARE MEMBERS OF THE
FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

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Denton, Jeremiah A. (R-Ala.)	SH-516 HSOB	224-5744	I-23
Dixon, Alan J. (D-Ill.)	SH-316 HSOB	224-2854	I-23
> Dodd, Christopher J. (D-Conn.)	SH-324 HSOB	224-2823	I-24
Dole, Robert (R-Kan.)	SH-141 HSOB	224-6521	I-25
Domenici, Pete V. (R-N.M.)	SD-434 DSOB	224-6621	I-26
Durenberger, David (R-Minn.)	SR-375 RSOB	224-3244	I-27
Eagleton, Thomas F. (D-Mo.)	SD-197 DSOB	224-5721	I-27
East, John P. (R-N.C.)	SH-716 HSOB	224-3154	I-28
Evans, Daniel J. (R-Wash.)	SH-702 HSOB	224-3441	I-28
Exon, J. James (D-Neb.)	SH-330 HSOB	224-4224	I-29
Ford, Wendell H. (D-Ky.)	SR-173A RSOB	224-4343	I-30
> Garn, Jake (R-Utah)	SD-505 DSOB	224-5444	I-31
Glenn, John H., Jr. (D-Ohio)	SH-503 HSOB	224-3353	I-32
Goldwater, Barry (R-Ariz.)	SR-363 RSOB	224-2235	I-32
Gorton, Slade (R-Wash.)	SH-513 HSOB	224-2621	I-33
Grassley, Charles E. (R-Iowa)	SH-135 HSOB	224-3744	I-33
Hart, Gary (D-Colo.)	SR-237 RSOB	224-5852	I-34
Hatch, Orrin G. (R-Utah)	SR-135 RSOB	224-5251	I-35
Hatfield, Mark O. (R-Ore.)	SH-711 HSOB	224-3753	I-36
Hawkins, Paula (R-Fla.)	SH-313 HSOB	224-3041	I-37
Hoelt, Chio (R-New)	SH-302 HSOB	224-6244	I-38
Heflin, Howell T. (D-Ala.)	SH-728 HSOB	224-4124	I-38
Heinz, John (R-Pa.)	SR-277 RSOB	224-6324	I-39
> Helms, Jesse (R-N.C.)	SD-402 DSOB	224-6342	I-40
Hollings, Ernest F. (D-S.C.)	SR-125 RSOB	224-6121	I-40
Huddleston, Walter D. (D-Ky.)	SD-262 DSOB	224-2541	I-41
Humphrey, Gordon J. (R-N.H.)	SH-531 HSOB	224-2841	I-42
Inouye, Daniel K. (D-Hawaii)	SH-722 HSOB	224-3934	I-43
Jepson, Roger W. (R-Iowa)	SR-120 RSOB	224-3254	I-44
Johnston, J. Bennett (D-La.)	SH-136 HSOB	224-5824	I-44
> Kassebaum, Nancy Landon (R-Kan.)	SR-302 RSOB	224-4774	I-45
Kasten, Robert W., Jr. (R-Wis.)	SH-110 HSOB	224-5323	I-46
Kennedy, Edward M. (D-Mass.)	SR-113 RSOB	224-4543	I-47

Name	Location	Telephone	Page
Lautenberg, Frank R. (D-N.J.)	SH-717 HSOB	224-4744	I-48
Laxalt, Paul (R-Nev.)	SR-323A RSOB	224-3542	I-49
Leahy, Patrick J. (D-Vt.)	SR-433 RSOB	224-4242	I-50
Levin, Carl M. (D-Mich.)	SR-459 RSOB	224-6221	I-51
Long, Russell B. (D-La.)	SR-225 RSOB	224-4623	I-51
> Lugar, Richard C. (R-Ind.)	SH-306 HSOB	224-4814	I-52
McClure, James A. (R-Idaho)	SD-361 DSOB	224-2752	I-52
> Mathias, Charles McC., Jr. (R-Md.)	SR-387 RSOB	224-4554	I-53
Matsunaga, Spark M. (D-Hawaii)	SH-109 HSOB	224-6361	I-54
Mattlingly, Mack (R-Ga.)	SH-320 HSOB	224-3643	I-55
Melcher, John (D-Mont.)	SH-730 HSOB	224-2644	I-56
Metzenbaum, Howard M. (D-Ohio)	SR-140 RSOB	224-2315	I-57
Mitchell, George J. (D-Maine)	SR-364 RSOB	224-5344	I-58
Moyrinhon, Daniel P. (D-N.Y.)	SR-464 RSOB	224-4451	I-58
> Murkowski, Frank H. (R-Alaska)	SH-317 HSOB	224-6665	I-59
Nickles, Don (R-Okla.)	SH-713 HSOB	224-5754	I-59
Nunn, Sam (D-Ga.)	SD-335 DSOB	224-3521	I-60
Packwood, Bob (R-Ore.)	SR-259 RSOB	224-5244	I-61
> Pell, Claiborne (D-R.I.)	SR-335 RSOB	224-4642	I-62
> Percy, Charles H. (R-Ill.)	SD-462 DSOB	224-2152	I-63
> Prosser, Larry (R-S.D.)	SR-407A RSOB	224-5842	I-63
Proxmire, William (D-Wis.)	SD-530 DSOB	224-5653	I-64
Poyer, David (D-Ark.)	SR-264 RSOB	224-2353	I-64
Quayle, Dan (R-Ind.)	SH-524 HSOB	224-5623	I-65
Randolph, Jennings (D-W.Va.)	SD-313 DSOB	224-6472	I-65
Riegle, Donald W., Jr. (D-Mich.)	SD-105 DSOB	224-4822	I-66
Roth, William V., Jr. (R-Del.)	SH-104 HSOB	224-2441	I-66
Rudman, Warren B. (R-N.H.)	SH-530 HSOB	224-3324	I-67
> Sarbanes, Paul S. (D-Md.)	SD-237 DSOB	224-4524	I-68
Sasser, James R. (D-Tenn.)	SR-298 RSOB	224-3344	I-69
Simpson, Alan K. (R-Wyo.)	SH-709 HSOB	224-3424	I-70
Specter, Arlen (R-Pa.)	SH-331 HSOB	224-4254	I-71
Stafford, Robert T. (R-Vt.)	SH-133 HSOB	224-5141	I-71
Stennis, John C. (D-Miss.)	SR-205 RSOB	224-6253	I-72
Stevens, Ted (R-Alaska)	SR-147 RSOB	224-3004	I-73
Symms, Steven D. (R-Idaho)	SH-509 HSOB	224-6142	I-74
Thurmond, Strom (R-S.C.)	SR-218 RSOB	224-5972	I-74
Tower, John G. (R-Tex.)	SR-179 RSOB	224-2934	I-75
Trible, Paul S., Jr. (R-Va.)	SH-517 HSOB	224-4024	I-76
> Teagarden, Paul E. (D-Mass.)	SR-392 RSOB	224-2742	I-77
Wallace, Malcolm (R-Wyo.)	SR-206 RSOB	224-6441	I-78
Warner, John W. (R-Va.)	SR-421 RSOB	224-2023	I-79
Weicker, Lowell P., Jr. (R-Conn.)	SH-303 HSOB	224-4041	I-80
Wilson, Pete (R-Calif.)	SH-720 HSOB	224-3841	I-81
> Zorinsky, Edward (D-Neb.)	SR-443 RSOB	224-6551	I-82

NAMES CROSSED OFF ARE COSPONSORS; NAMES WITH AN
ARROW (>) NEXT TO THEM ARE MEMBERS OF THE FOREIGN
AFFAIRS COMMITTEE.

[Democrats in roman, Republicans in *italic*—Resident Commissioner and Delegates in boldface]

NAME

Air Conditioning (C) (HOB) (RHOBI)

Airlines Ticket Office (L) Architect's Office

Architect of the Cap Assistant Architect

Accounting Office Art and Reference

Curator Electrical Engineer

Payroll Personnel

Purchasing Wage and Classification

Arms Control and Foreign Caucus

Attending Physician Beauty Shop

Bill Status (See LEGIS O Botanic Garden

Conservatory Plant Shows or Glass

Popular Posters Cafeteria (LHOB) (HOB Ann. 2)

Caterer (CAPI) (LHOB) (RHOBI) (HOB Ann. 2)

Coffee Shop (Capit. Commissary (HOB) Manager (RHOBI)

Memo Information Page Service (RHI)

California Democratic Congressional Delegate

Carpenter Shop (Capitol) (Underground Gar.)

Carry Out Food Service (L) (LHOB) (RHOBI) (HOB Ann. 2)

Car Wash (C) (HOB) (RHOBI)

Caucus Room

Chaplain

Clerk of the House Daily Digest

Furnace Office Leg. Information (L Legislative Operations

Bill Clerk Enrolling Clerk

Journal Clerk Reading Clerk

Tally Clerk Library of House (C) Library (Capitol)

Locksmith Office Equipment S. (LHOB)

Office Supply Service (LHOB)

Official Reporters Debates (Capit. Committees

Summary of Proceeding Debate

Placement Office (C Property Supply Publications Office

Recording Studio (R Records & Registrar Telephone Exchange

Timewort Repair (L) Commission on

Franklin Security and Cooper Europe

Congressional Arms Caucus Congressional Black Caucus

Congressional Budget (C) (Caucus not in session)

Congressional Cleaners Future

Congressional Hispanic (C Congressional Publications

Long Dist. Congressional Record by Congressional Research

Congressional Rural Caucus Congressional Staff Clerk

Congressional Support Credit Union

Custodial Office (Capitol) Near Informational

Telephone Vice Democratic Caucus

Item Congressional Clerk Democratic Personnel (C) RHOBI

Item Research Organization Item Streaming & Plans

Democratic Study Group

Air Defense Weapons for Afghanistan

Current Situation Versus Recommendations

Prepared for Decisionmakers Dealing With Afghan Aid

Prepared by:

Andrew Eiva - Field work with the Afghan resistance 1980 to 1983. USMA 1972. Extensive proficiency with air defense weapons and crew served infantry weapons. Executive Director of the Federation for American Afghan Action.

Lance Motley - Field work with the Afghan resistance 1985 to 1986. USMA 79. Rangers and Paratroopers 79-84.

Prepared February 26, 1986

The current U.S. program has failed to impede the annihilation of the heroic Afghan nation by Soviet helicopters and bombers.


To withstand the Soviet gunships, the Afghans require the free world's full support in the following weapons systems:

- a) Shoulder launched, man-portable air defense missiles;
- b) Heavy machine guns for air defense;
- c) Indirect fire weapons.

A. MISSILE SYSTEMS



REDEYE MISSILE SYSTEM



SA-7 MISSILE SYSTEM



BLOWPIPE

I. Evaluation:

Shoulder-fired heat-seeking missiles have the capability to destroy or disable aircraft at an altitude of between 2000 and 3000 meters. Currently there are an insignificant number of SA-7 type missile systems reaching Afghan hands.

There are three missiles that should be considered for the Afghan Freedom Fighters:

Redeye - The Redeye was developed for the US Army in the late 1960's. It has a range of about 3km and weighs only 8.2 kg.

Drawbacks: The infrared system of the Redeye needs a

good heat source to track. This means that the gunner needs to let the aircraft pass him so that he can aim at the engine exhaust. Flares can be used to divert the missile.

Benefits: The Redeye is easy to use. The gunner merely aims at the target, engages the tracker, and at the sound of a buzzer, fires the missile. The missile then homes in on the engine heat without the need for the gunner to track the target.

The Redeye system is being replaced in US arsenals by the Stinger missile. The Stinger has a direct fire capability along with other improvements. This frees a large number of Redeyes for use by the Afghan guerrillas at no further cost to the US (about 33,000 Redeyes were produced).

SA-7 - The SA-7 is a Soviet-designed weapon based on the American Redeye. It has a range of 5km and weighs 9.2 kg.

Drawbacks: The SA-7 shares the same tracking deficiencies as the Redeye. Since this system is of foreign manufacture, the United States government must purchase them from other nations. Each system costs about \$170,000 (includes one launcher and four missiles). The SA-7 also has a history of unreliability due to the lack of a cooling system for the infrared (IR) tracker. While a new version of the SA-7 includes a cooling system, IR filters and increased range, most systems available to US sources are the older models.

Benefits: The SA-7 is easy to use. The gunner aims at the target, pulls the trigger half-way back, and fires the missile when a green light flashes on (in contrast, the Redeye uses two triggers). The SA-7 also has a longer range than the Redeye, 5 km vs. 3 km.

Blowpipe - The Blowpipe is a British system with a range of 6.4 km and a weight of 21 kg.

Drawbacks: As with the SA-7, this system is of foreign manufacture and must be purchased abroad. Unlike the SA-7 and Redeye, however, the Blowpipe is not a fire-and-forget system. The Blowpipe guides the missile to the target using radio waves, and requires the gunner to track the target and guide the missile with a remote control until the target is hit. While tracking, the gunner is vulnerable to fire from the target and other aircraft (helicopters and Migs rarely attack alone). Because the gunner must control the missile in flight, a great deal of training is required to attain proficiency. Something difficult in a guerrilla situation.

Benefits: Since the Blowpipe is not heat-seeking, it has a direct fire capability and is not diverted by flares.

STINGER - The Stinger missile is an improved version of the Redeye system. It has a range of 5km and a weight of 15.7 kg.

Drawbacks: The Stinger has a power pack that must be worn when firing the missile.

Benefits: The Stinger has a filter system that reduces the possibility that the missile will be diverted by flares. This missile also has a head-on capability that allows the gunner to fire before the aircraft passes overhead. Each system costs about \$53,000.

II. Recommendation:

The United States should send a relevant quantity of Redeye systems to the Afghan Freedom Fighters (at least 10,000). The ease of operation, fire-and-forget capability, and cost effectiveness (available without additional expenditures) make the Redeye the preferred system. 500 Stingers should also be provided to give the resistance head-on capability.

B. HEAVY MACHINE-GUNS



12.7 mm HEAVY
MACHINE-GUN



14.5 mm HEAVY MACHINE-GUN

I. Evaluation:

Presently, the Afghan resistance is equipped with the 12.7mm and 14.5mm heavy machine-guns. While these systems are rugged and effective, lack of ammunition and training makes them impotent. Although some improvement in ammunition resupply has taken place in 1984 and 1985, the resupply rates still fall far short of what is needed. Furthermore, most machine-gunners observed in Afghanistan have no concept of how to lead (aim

ahead of) a moving aircraft, rendering them ineffective. The combination of ammunition shortages and lack of air defense training still cripple the potential of heavy machine guns.

II. Recommendation


Priority must be given to ammunition, particularly armor-piercing and tracer. US representatives should accompany these shipments all the way to the Afghanistan border. Our aid must not be allowed to be "lost" inside of Pakistan.

Effective training is necessary for the Afghan Freedom Fighters in the use of lead when engaging aircraft and in small arms for air defense.

C. INDIRECT FIRE WEAPONS



82 mm MORTAR



107 mm TYPE 63 ROCKET SYSTEM

I. Evaluation:

In the mountainous and largely treeless terrain of Afghanistan, indirect fire is mandatory for effective resistance. At present, however, the guerrillas have inadequate indirect fire weapons and training to use those weapons.

Weapons - The current mainstay in the guerrilla indirect fire arsenal is the 82mm mortar. This tube has a range of about only 3 km, and many models lack the bipod leg adjustment necessary for accurate fire. Furthermore, ammunition is seldom available to fire more than 5 to 10 rounds per month. Since even a trained gunner needs four or five rounds just to adjust on target, this leaves little for target destruction.

Additionally, the Chinese type 63 is arriving in ever larger quantities in 1984 and 1985. Although this is the most significant improvement in the Afghan covert aid program so far, first hand observations indicate a hit rate much smaller than reported and its overall inaccuracy prevent it from having a decisive battlefield impact.

Training - Guerrilla mortar training is non-existent. Most groups don't know how to emplace a mortar, and the sight is not under-

stood. Since the sight is not used, reverse slope firing cannot be conducted and crews must be line-of-sight to the enemy.

II. Recommendation:

Weapons - The Afghan resistance needs European or American-made mortars that have a range of about 5 km. At 275 kg, the 120mm Soviet-designed mortar is too heavy for general guerrilla use, so Western weapons should be provided. The argument that the guerrillas should get communist-manufactured mortars so they can use captured ammunition is not valid because the Soviets no longer use the 82mm mortar (with the exception of some airborne units). The Afghan guerrillas now get Chinese made 82mm mortars. For a similar cost we can provide the resistance with mortars of about twice the range.

More Chinese type-63 rocket launchers are necessary. This system is easy to operate and has a range of about 8km. It can be quickly disassembled and carried by the resistance. The 107mm rocket it fires can also be easily fired without the tube. Although this method is not very accurate, it is effective against large targets.

Training - It is essential that the resistance be trained on mortar gunnery. Knowledge of the use of the sight and firing table will give them a reverse slope capability. Firing methods without the use of FDC must be emphasized due to simplicity and efficiency. Select personnel should receive FDC training and radios to make them effective.

CONCLUSION

The overall performance in delivering aid to the Afghans does not yet indicate a serious desire to win.