



# Federation for American Afghan Action

*June. 1985*

## Board Members

Neal B. Blair—Chairman  
Sayed J. Houssein—President  
Don Weidenweber  
Abdul Madjid Zabuli  
Thomas Gouttierre

## Executive Director

Andrew L. Eiva

## CIA REPORT CARD ON AFGHAN COVERT OPERATIONS

The enclosed document evaluates CIA performance in aiding the Afghan Resistance in terms of the key functioning areas in successfully supporting legitimate resistance movements.



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## KEY SUCCESS FACTORS IN SUPPORTING LEGITIMATE GUERRILLA MOVEMENTS

Improving the quality and quantity of arms alone will have little effect unless the organization of the support effort incorporates the key success factors which the history of guerrilla warfare support operations has demonstrated:

- 1) Value Based. Visibly based on a credible commitment to a people's struggle for liberty and survival, and not an exploitation of a movement's aspirations as expendable strategic poker chips. Americans acting as Americans.
- 2) Delinkage. The prevention of superpower confrontation requires guerrilla support elements effectively delinked from direct superpower control.
- 3) Long Term Commitment. The protracted nature of revolutionary warfare requires insulation from short-term political vicissitudes and tradeoffs.
- 4) Effective Delivery of Logistics by Integrating the Following Considerations:
  - a. Direct delivery to guerrilla units which fight;
  - b. Weapons, quantities, and schedules tailored to local guerrilla needs;
  - c. Sustained follow through in spare parts, ammunition, repair and maintenance equipment; and
  - d. Effective training program on site.

## KEY SUCCESS FACTOR I - VALUE BASED

### Definition:

Visibly based on a credible commitment to a people's struggle to be free, and not on a cynical exploitation of a movement's aspirations as expendable geopolitical poker chips.

Flawed values undermined the United States covert Afghan operation from the start. Shortly after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the National Security Council conducted a "finding" to initiate the Afghan covert operation in January of 1980 (a finding is the standard bureaucratic term for a National Security Council policy decision in a covert operation, usually running 10 to 12 typewritten pages). The finding was to give the Afghan resistance "enough to survive" but not enough to jeopardize Pakistani or Soviet positions in the region. This led to a policy that systematically gives the Afghan resistance only enough to fight and die and condemns them to a slow death.

The bureaucratic decision to place the interests of the Pakistan dictatorship ahead of the Afghan fight for freedom dooms both to eventual Soviet domination. This is not a bureaucratic fluke; for over three decades the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency implemented our foreign policy by sacrificing American principles of freedom in favor of the status-quo as they now do in South Asia.

The universal appeal of the Afghan cause combined with an unaccountable covert program has created one of the most lucrative bonanzas in the history of American foreign aid. The murky "no-win" policy provides opportunities for spending and profits while vague objectives create a lackadaisical environment in which bureaucrats are free from the demands for performance and excellence that a policy for success entails. Short term "no-win" policies invariably evolve into long run "must-lose" policies.

Solid values are a precondition to sound policy. Sound policy is a precondition for effective implementation. Tinkering with implementation without addressing the values and policy is tantamount to treating the symptoms without diagnosing the disease.

The current status-quo implementation of our Afghan policy does not reflect American values; it subverts them.

## KEY SUCCESS FACTOR II - DELINKAGE

### Definition:

The prevention of superpower confrontation requires guerrilla support elements effectively delinked from direct superpower control.

In peacetime, superpower paramilitary operations such as resistance movement support require delinkage to prevent war. Throughout history, major powers have used the following techniques for delinkage, sometimes individually, sometimes in combination; use of a non-governmental organization as an intermediary, internationalization, free market support, proxy governments, proxy forces, and covertness.

In Afghanistan, the United States has adopted the covert option supplemented by the use of the Pakistan government as a proxy. For thirty years, the United States used covert operations as our method of delinkage, turning the noble and idealistic pursuit of supporting resistance movements into sneaky and dishonest operations.

As a result of this policy, the bureaucracy that has evolved to support these operations, the Directorate of Operations, bears the scars of moral and professional degeneration that such a dishonest role eventually brings. This is particularly ironic when the cause of liberation epitomizes our best and fundamental American values and has the capacity to attract the most innovative, courageous, and romantic talent we have.

## KEY SUCCESS FACTOR III - LONG TERM COMMITMENT

### Definition:

The protracted nature of guerrilla warfare requires insulation from short-term political vicissitudes and trade-offs.

By working solely through a fragile dictatorship, the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency have created a vulnerable jugular to tempt the Soviets. A single 35 cent, 9 mm bullet in President Zia Ul Haq's head has the potential to instantaneously negate the shipment routes and support mechanisms it took over four billion taxpayer dollars to acquire.

#### KEY SUCCESS FACTOR IV - EFFECTIVE DELIVERY OF LOGISTICS

Definition: Effective delivery requires integration of the following;

- A. Direct delivery to guerrilla units which fight;
- B. Weapons, quantities, and schedules tailored to local guerrilla needs;
- C. Sustained follow-through in spare parts, ammunitions, repair and maintenance equipment; and
- D. Effective training programs on site.

##### A. Direct delivery to units which fight.

Currently, the CIA Directorate of Operations delivers aid through a four phase tortuous route replete with opportunities for corruption, wastage, interception, incompetence, and misuse. The four phases are:

- Phase 1: CIA purchase and movement to Pakistan;
- Phase 2: Movement across Pakistan under Pakistani control;
- Phase 3: Pakistani delivery to resistance leaders; and
- Phase 4: Shipping weapons to the resistance forces across the tribal areas, the Afghan-Pak border, and across Afghanistan.

Phase 1: CIA purchase. Many of the major CIA arms purchases for the resistance have puzzled weapons experts.

For example, the SAM-7's popularity as a terrorist weapon makes it expensive (\$35,000 to \$50,000 per system), and the Directorate of Operations has apparently spent over \$3 million dollars of American taxpayer's money to buy the Afghan resistance a weapon that proved totally useless against armored helicopters and jet fighters in its last secret war in Angola.

The CIA has also purchased approximately \$22 million dollars worth of 12.7 mm ammunition for the guerrillas' only effective anti-air weapon, the Dashaka heavy machine gun. Unfortunately, 85% of the ammunition is non-armor piercing, ineffective against armored gunships.

Thus, two of the CIA's most ineffective arms purchases have curiously occurred in the area of greatest guerrilla need, air defense.

The chief of the CIA task force in its Angolan secret war,

#### KEY SUCCESS FACTOR IV (cont.)

described his experiences with CIA ammunition and weapons management in the Angolan operation as follows: "Early on in these logistical doings I had a nasty surprise - the CIA did not have a competent office to plan and arrange arms and shipments. Its...staff was surprisingly inept at the hard, detailed planning required for a war effort...Why don't we throw in some forty-five caliber pistols?" one of them would quip, "They're worthless in combat but we can get them cheap." The results reflected our amateurism. We delivered into Angola 622 crew-served mortars, rockets, and machine guns; 4,210 anti-tank rockets, and 20,986 rifles, even though UNITA and the FNLA combined never fielded more than 10,000 soldiers. Most of the rifles were obsolete World War II semi-automatics, no match for the AK's the MPLA was getting." (In Search of Enemies - John Stockwell)

Phase 2: Movement across Pakistan. Although Congress has appropriated \$342 million dollars to CIA's Directorate of Operations for arms to the Afghan resistance during the first four years, the purchase value of the arms arriving for the resistance leaders in Pakistan is only \$102 million dollars (given some of the ineffective purchases, the combat value is sizably smaller still).

The \$240 million dollar shortfall occurs during the following three covert steps: favorable lucrative prices for arms dealers who are former CIA employees, other CIA "overhead" and Pakistani siphoning. The share of each is difficult to estimate. In any event, preliminary calculations give a figure of \$240 million dollars for which the CIA needs to account to the United States taxpayers and Congress by the end of Phase 2.

Phase 3: Pakistani delivery to resistance leaders. This is probably the most debilitating link in the chain. The Pakistanis have used their control of arms distribution to systematically disrupt any attempt by the guerrillas to form a unified command. For example, the Pakistanis succeeded in exacerbating a personal conflict into a full-fledged guerrilla schism by providing the ammunition and weapons for Mansour Nasrullah to split his people away from Maulawi Mahammedi Nabi in 1982, greatly injuring the capacity of the Arakat Ingelable Islami, one of the largest guerrilla groups, to function effectively.



## KEY SUCCESS FACTOR (cont.)

Phase 4: Shipping the weapons from the resistance headquarters to the fighting fronts. The interior commanders bear the brunt of this responsibility, using backpacks, beasts of burden, camels, trucks and jeeps to bring the logistics to the fighting front. In late 1984, Soviet forces stepped up their operations to disrupt resistance resupply by deploying units closer to guerrilla resupply routes and stepping up helicopter and commando efforts. Additionally, the Soviets have littered resupply trails with hundreds of thousands of butterfly mines which are taking an increasing toll from the resistance resupply columns, crippling the feet of freedom fighters and pack animals alike. This cumbersome resupply method consumes a major portion of the energy, time and talent of the fighting fronts and the external headquarters.

Additionally, this resupply network is geographically dependent on proximity to guerrilla command centers in Peshawar and Quetta, and penalizes resistance forces in northern, western, and central Afghanistan. The key Soviet resupply roads which lead to Herat and Kabul are critical, accessible and vulnerable, but resistance groups in these strategic areas simply do not get the relatively small amount of heavier weapons and ammunitions necessary to cut them.

### B. Quantity, quality and delivery schedules of weapons tailored to local guerrilla needs.

The small quality and low quantity of supplies, the methods of delivery, the geographic constraints, and the political manipulations turn the resistance's resupply effort into an all consuming dog-eat-dog battle for survival among the fighting fronts which totally precludes any serious effort to tailor arms deliveries to strategies, needs, training and military development of local guerrilla forces.

### C. Sustained follow-through in spare parts, ammunition, repair and maintenance equipment (easy items to overlook).

#### 1. Spare Parts - The resupply pipeline has overlooked

#### KEY SUCCESS FACTOR IV (cont.)

several key shortages in spare parts as well. Of particular note is the large number of heavy machine guns out of action due to lack of spare barrels. Spare barrels for machine guns are standard equipment in most armies, but in the case of the resistance, hundreds of \$4,500 machine guns that taxpayers paid for are sitting around useless because the Directorate of Operations doesn't have a resupply officer brilliant enough to provide a supply of \$200 spare barrels.

2. Ammunition - The greatest single debilitating factor for the resistance fronts fighting in Afghanistan is the ammunition shortage for their key weapons. The RPG-7 Soviet rocket launcher, the world's best light anti-tank weapon, is a valued guerrilla weapon. Professor Edward Luttwak, senior defense consultant, calls the RPG-7 the "Soviet system's greatest contribution to Western civilization." But the resupply for it averages one round a month, enough to conduct two or three ambushes a year. The 12.7mm Dashaka averages 600 rounds a month, an amount sufficient for a single skirmish. Although CIA operatives in Pakistan have bragged to journalists that the CIA had raised the number of machine guns in Panjshir from 17 in 1982 to 200 in 1984 (independent observers counted 87 in October), they did not bother to tell the journalists they had supplied each of them with only enough ammunition for 5 minutes of combat. The frequently heard report that the "resistance is now better armed than ever before" is superficially correct, but it is meaningless in light of the mismanaged CIA ammunition resupply effort.

#### D. Effective training on site.

Five years of combat casualties have imbued most resistance fighters with a degree of caution that was not there in the beginning. But tactics and operations are still desultory and unplanned, with even well-equipped guerrilla fighting fronts unable to mount meaningful attacks.

What makes the lack of training so painful to professional military men who have worked with them is the outstanding capacity of the Afghan warrior to absorb military training compared with other ethnic groups.

For example, during quick-kill training, a rapid fire technique for close combat, Afghans have gone from 4 hits per thirty shots to thirty hits out of 30 shots in less than one hour.



"Illiterate" Afghans I have traveled with display an ability to read tactical maps after only a day of coaching and practical work comparable to American G.I.'s who were high school graduates.

The inadequacy of the current training results in a highly unfavorable Afghan/Soviet kill ratio. This makes long term Afghan defeat inevitable unless a sound training program is implemented.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Andrew L. Eiva".

Andrew L. Eiva  
Executive Director



# American Afghan Education Fund

June 12, 1984

The Coverup of CIA Ineffectiveness in Afghanistan Through Misleading Information Planted in Time Magazine on June 11, 1984.

Reference: Time, June 11, 1984, Caravans on Moonless Nights, pg. 38-40.

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Thomas Goutierre

## Executive Director

Matthew D. Erulkar  
Guerrilla Warfare Specialist  
Andrew L. Eiva

1. "American satellites detected movements that allowed agents to warn rebels of the impending attack."

Comment: Massoud knew the attack was coming anyway, since he deliberately provoked it by staging ambushes on the Salang Road.

2. "The thwarting of Goodbye Massoud was the most recent, and perhaps the most daring, success of the CIA's operation to assist the embattled guerrillas."

Comment: No thwarting, no daring, no success. On the second of May, Soviet gunships spotted 300 reinforcements arriving in Panjshir and slaughtered 200 of them, since they were totally lacking in air defense weapons. The Soviet backed forces still hold the valley, so Goodbye Massoud is far from thwarted. Since the CIA does not have the nerve to put any of its officers in Afghanistan, "daring" is hardly appropriate.

3. "CIA...supplying...RPG-7 rocket launchers"

Comment: Yes, but the ammunition resupply rate for this excellent Soviet-made bazooka is kept at about one round a month, rendering it inoperable about 95% of the time.

4. "CIA...supplying ..... surface-to-air missiles"

Comment: Yes, they've chosen the SAM-7 for the Afghan resistance, a weapon they know is worthless from its performance in Angola, their last secret war.

5. "Getting the material they need to the mujahedin must be one of the most hazardous and difficult supply tasks ever undertaken in modern military history."

Comment: First, they're clearly not getting the mujahedin what they need. Second, the flimsy, low-risk (to themselves) operation the CIA's Directorate of Operations is conducting is comparable neither to the heroic Vietnamese effort down the Ho Chi Minh trail nor the CIA DC-3 resupply flights to the anti-Soviet partisans in the Ukraine in the fifties. The operation is neither outstanding in its hazards nor difficulties as currently conducted.

6. "The pipeline ...passing through Pakistan without the Pakistanis being aware that it was there."

Comment: Absolutely false. Pakistanis are not only aware of the pipeline, they also control distribution and reserve veto power over quantities and qualities of munitions sent. Their method of distribution has fostered guerrilla suspicions, divisions, and has been a key factor in preventing guerrilla unification.

7. "The CIA pipeline to the guerrillas, initiated by the Carter Administration, was stepped up by Casey soon after President Reagan's election".

Comment: Field deliveries to the interior commanders ground to a halt during the first six months of the Reagan administration, provoking massive disillusionment with Reagan's promises among resistance leaders. Eventual pickup in the aid level during the following years was of such overall poor quality and quantity as to induce great cynicism about America's ability to deliver on its promises.

8. "The CIA archives on Pakistan are perhaps the best in the world...where the CIA has for three decades run a topnotch network of agents and safehouses."

"When the CIA pipeline first moved in, there wasn't a path into or out of Afghanistan that they didn't have mapped down to every physical detail."

Comment: The archives, safehouses, and networks mentioned were primarily put together by several motivated Americans in the region before the war, while the Agency boys in Kabul, Islamabad stayed mostly on the diplomatic cocktail circuit.

9. "The Afghans probably make use of this system to send along their arms."

Comment: Less than 5%.

10. "U.S. Army ordnance depots in the U.S. and West Germany collected the materiel, (mines), erased all the U.S. markings, then sent it to a CIA installation near Stuttgart."

Comment: The Authenticity of this report is hard to believe, since none of the mines observed in Afghanistan have been of American manufacture, while the appearance of U.S. mines is well known to enough people that erasure will not fool anybody that counts.

11. "Airdrops are possible in rare circumstances, but the Soviets have radar and fast interceptors."

Comment: This misleading statement is particularly significant, because it is an attempt to denigrate what is potentially the best mechanism available to get effective arms into the hands of those who fight, something that is not happening now. The ineffectiveness of Soviet radar and interceptors was vividly demonstrated by the difficulties the Soviets had finding and vectoring aircraft to intercept a jumbo 747 flying at commercial altitude over some of their most secret installations during the Flight 007 incident. The radar defenses in southern Afghanistan are penetratable by dropping to 2500 feet along most of the border, and can be flown in with hardly any more difficulty than Colombian marijuana or Bolivian cocaine are flown into the U.S.A.

12. "Two years ago, the six major guerrilla groups within Afghanistan had to communicate by messenger; during the latest Soviet assault, Massoud was able to use radios to call for assistance from other rebel bands."

Comment: Another misleading juxtaposition of two unrelated events to make it sound like another CIA improvement-the requirement of the major guerrilla groups to use messengers remains totally unaffected by the provision of a handful of field radios to Massoud for local tactical use.

13. "The pipeline is probably working at close to its capacity, and the CIA is determined not to upset its delicate system. For that reason, the agency has, in recent months, refused to increase the quality or quantity of U.S. aid to Afghan rebels."

Comment: The CIA puts across its bottom line. It will continue aid at a level that condemns the Afghan resistance to a slow death no matter what Congress or anybody else says.

*Andrew T. Egan*



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Thomas Goutierre

### Executive Director

Andrew L. Eiva

### Legislative Director

Matthew D. Erulkar

May 29, 1985

Dear Friend:

"America is stronger because of the values we hold dear. We believe faith and freedom must be our guiding stars, for they show us truth, make us brave, give us hope, and leave us wiser than we were. Our progress began not in Washington, D.C. but in the hearts of our families, communities, work places and voluntary groups which, together, are unleashing the invincible spirit of one great Nation under God ... (A)gain, the heros are our people, not government."

President Ronald W. Reagan  
State of the Union Address  
February 6, 1985

For over five years, concerned citizens across this land have pressured the United States Government to take resolute, effective action to aid the Afghan people in their defense against the Soviet executed slaughter of their nation. For over five years the American government has failed the Afghan people -- failed the American patriots who support the cause of Afghan freedom.

Instead of action, the American people have had to settle for excuses. The government's policy has been to give the Afghans enough to fight and die, but not enough to win.

Disgusted by their government's failure to properly aid the Afghan people, a growing number of concerned Americans have decided to do it themselves. This was the beginning of the Partner Cities Project.

The project was inspired by telephone calls from American communities asking for help in sending aid to Afghanistan. Up until now there has been no point of central resource and information where these groups could turn for help.

Partner Cities is an American ideal -- people helping people, building brotherhood and personal satisfaction in a way that bureaucracy bound government programs won't ever do.

Right now, in Afghanistan, millions of people are being stripped of the basic necessities of life by the invading Russian army. Without adequate food, clothing, medicine and equipment the Afghans will not survive. Already more than a million have died and millions more have been driven into exile.

FAAA is coordinating the Partner Cities relief system by which parties in the United States, whether it be state or city governments, community or church organizations, or any group with humanitarian interests, can adopt a corresponding community in Afghanistan and minister to its humanitarian needs. This is the Partner Cities Project.

For the first time, FAAA has gathered the necessary information to help adoptive or "partner" groups in America channel their resources into effective humanitarian aid for Afghanistan. That information is enclosed with this letter, including lists of needs along with names and numbers of organizations capable of translating the good will of the American people into timely help for the Afghan people.


The Federation's role in this people-to-people aid effort is three-fold. 1) Expedite links between aid sponsors in the United States and aid recipients in Afghanistan. 2) Identify the most reliable aid organizations as well as the most reliable routes for getting aid from the United States to Afghanistan. 3) Coordinate exchange visits between interested parties in the United States and Afghanistan.

All aid goes to the Afghans in the name of the sponsoring community or organization, not in the name of the Federation.

The time to help is now. A major rise in appropriations for the Afghan resistance, grassroots support for Afghans springing up across America, a new Soviet scorched-earth strategy -- all add up to 1985 as the year of decision for Afghanistan.

Please call now for help starting a Partner City in your area. The time is coming when, together, Americans will set the whole world free. Your call will make a difference.

Sincerely,



Spencer N. Lee  
Partner Project Coordinator

## ESTABLISHING MEDICAL CLINICS IN AFGHANISTAN

One of the most pressing humanitarian needs in Afghanistan today is for clinics established inside the country to help alleviate the suffering from wounds and disease brought on by the present war. The International Medical Corps is an organization which has practical experience establishing clinics inside Afghanistan. Currently they have three clinics in operation.

Because everything necessary for the kind of clinics which have practical value in Afghanistan is available in Pakistan, purchases are made there. This avoids unnecessary shipping expense. Purchases for the clinics are handled by IMC personnel. Funds are either hand carried to Pakistan or sent by wire transfer. Equipment is transported into Afghanistan by IMC personnel.

### Cost of Clinics Broken Down By Class

Class A Mobile Clinic - \$12,000.

Class A units are desirable in most areas of Afghanistan for security reasons. Soviet's don't hesitate to bomb hospitals.

Class A Permanent Clinic - \$30,000.

2 or 3 cave locations have been identified inside Afghanistan that would be safe enough to establish permanent hospitals. These would facilitate generators and, therefore, x-ray capability along with other procedures that require electrical power.

Class B Mobile Clinic - \$8,000.

This facility is generally the result of not having enough funds to a Class A unit. The goal is to establish a clinic and then upgrade.

The average monthly cost to keep a clinic in operation is about \$5,000. The attached pages list the equipment generally purchased to establish a clinic as well as the most frequently needed medical supplies necessary to keep a clinic in operation.

If you would like to help establish a medical clinic in Afghanistan, contact:



INTERNATIONAL  
MEDICAL  
CORPS

MICHAEL UTTER  
Executive Director

(213) 459-6448

P.O. BOX 49525  
LOS ANGELES, CA 90049





INTERNATIONAL  
MEDICAL  
CORPS

P.O. BOX 49525  
LOS ANGELES, CA 90049

INTERNATIONAL MEDICAL CORPS  
EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH AFGHAN CLINICS

1. Basic surgical instruments - \$3,000.
2. Orthopedic instruments - \$5,000.
3. Chest instruments - \$2,500.
4. Neurosurgical instruments - \$800.
5. X-ray machine - \$14,000.
6. Generator, Japanese 2.64 kva - \$800 or,  
Generator, Chinese 12 horsepower - \$1,200.
7. Anasthesia equipment - \$12,000.
8. Skeletal traction equipment - \$9,000.
9. Microscope - \$150.
10. Special needs:
  - a) Mules to use as ambulances - \$2,000 each.
  - b) Trucks for use in Pakistan to transport equipment -  
\$10,000 each plus gas and repair costs.



# INTERNATIONAL MEDICAL CORPS

P.O. BOX 49525  
LOS ANGELES, CA 90049

## INTERNATIONAL MEDICAL CORPS MOST FREQUENTLY REQUIRED MEDICAL SUPPLIES April 5, 1985

1. Surgical gloves, sizes 7, 7 1/2, 8
2. Sterile gauze bandages and dressings
3. Plaster of paris
4. Betadyne solution (gallons or litres)
5. Intravenous cannula (18 or 16 gauge)
6. Normal saline
7. IV sets for infusions
8. Analgesics IM, PO, IV
9. Morphine
10. Broad spectrum antibiotics
  - Cephalosporins
  - Penicillins
  - Tetracycline
  - Chloranphenicol (eardrops)
  - Ampacillin
  - Bacitracin
11. Anti-malarials (chloroquine)
12. Syringes
13. Needles (18 and 20 gauge)
14. Diazepan injectable
15. Sutures, any size (silk, nylon, catgut)
16. Surgical instrument sets for extremity and abdominal surgery

## MEDICAL SUPPLIES FOR TRANSPORT

Some organizations have access more to actual medical supplies than to cash. The need for these supplies is great. Americares Foundation has vast expertise in transporting these goods all over the world, including to those affected by the ravages of the Afghan war. On the following pages is a list of medical supplies Americares found the greatest need for among Afghans.

To arrange shipment of medical supplies or for more information please contact:

### AMERICARES

Americares Foundation  
51 Locust Avenue  
New Canaan, CT 06840

James M. Schaffer  
(203) 966-5195  
Telex:  
965 880  
VF Corp NCAN

Analgesics

Anacin  
 Tylenol  
 Aspirin  
 Codeine

or equivalent

Anti-Allergy

Chlorphenamine  
 Benadril  
 Prednisolon  
 Synaral Ointment

or equivalent

Antibiotics

Penicillin - Procaine  
 Benzathine  
 Ampicillin, injectible and capsules  
 Tetracycline  
 Sulfametho-Trimetoprine - Bactrim - Septra Tablets  
 Chloramphenicol  
 Streptomycin - Syromycin  
 I N H  
 Ethambutol - Myambutol  
 Rifamycin - Rifadin - Rifampin - Rimactan  
 Erythromycin  
 Nitrofurantoin  
 Doxycycline hyclate - Vibramycin

Anti-Parasitics

Metronidazole - Flagyl  
 Chloroquin - Aralen Hydrochloride  
 Primaquine - Aralen Phosphate  
 Piperazine - Antepar  
 Niclosamide - (For Tapeworm)  
 Mebendazole - Vermox  
 Pyrenitol Pamoate  
 Nystatine - Tetrastatine - Declostatin - Mycostatin

Anesthetics

Lidocaine  
 Ketamine - Ketalar

Anti Epileptic and Sedative Hypnotics

Diazepam - Valium  
 Phenobarbitol  
 Chlordiazepoxide - Librium  
 Chlorprothazine  
 Diphenylhydantoin

Antacids

Creamalin  
 Caviscon

or equivalent

Anti Diarrheals

Pectin-Kaolin - Dia-Quel  
Lomotil or equivalent

For Respiratory Tract Diseases

Benadryl syrup  
Ammonium Chloride syrup - Ambynyl - Quelidrine  
Potassium Iodide Liquid - Elixophyllin

Bronchial Dilators

Aminophyllin, syrup, tablets, ampules

Vaccines (Require Refrigeration)

Measles (Rubeola)  
DPT  
Tetanus Toxoid  
Typhoid  
Polio (Oral)  
Tuberculosis

Parental Nutrients

Solution Glucose - Hydra-Lyte  
Glucose Syrup  
Solution Saline  
Solution Ringers  
Amino Acid Infusion  
Plasma Protein Fraction - Protenate

Oral Rehydration Salts, Powders

Oral Electrolyte Mixture  
Protein Tablets

Vitamins

Multivitamins, Tablets & Syrup  
B6, B1, B12, Ampules and Tablets - Calcium  
Vitamin K  
Vitamins plus Amino Acids - (For Jaundice)

Anti-Venoms and Anti Toxins (Some require refrigeration)

Snake - Spider - Scorpion  
Tetanus  
Diphtheria

Analeptic Cardio Vascular

Nikethamine - Coramine  
Heptaminol Chlorohydrate or equivalent

Anti Scabies

Benzyl Benzoate or equivalent

Anti Lice

Gamma Benzene Hexachloride or equivalent

Other

Antiseptics - Eardrops - Eye drops - Decongestants - Anabolics -  
Diuretics - Anti depressants - Anti Diabetic Agents - Hypertension  
Medication - Metheral - Dexamethazone

DDT Powder

Pharmaceutical Supplies

Bandages and gauze, different sizes - Ace Bandages - Cotton balls and  
Cotton Rolls - Surgical Tape -

Syringes and needles - Needles, straight and curved - I.V. Needles -  
Angiocath - Spinal anesthetic needles - Butterfly needles for children

Basic Surgical Instruments - Hemostats - Needle holders - Pickups -  
Scissors for primary suturing - Tourniquet, pneumatic and simple -  
Scalpels and blades - Amputation saws - Bonecutting forceps - Retractors  
Forceps, tooth and plain - Catgut

Surgical gloves #7 and up - Autoclave - Thoracic catheters, Foley catheters  
Disposable surgical field drapes and barriers

Sterilizers



## FM BROADCASTING STATIONS

There is desperate a need in Afghanistan for free radio. Resistance International and The Federation for American Afghan Action are coordinating efforts to establish and maintain 12 field studios along with adequate transmitters to offset the barrage of communist controlled information flooding the Afghan airways.

The cost for establishing the studios is about \$4,000 initial investment per studio plus about \$1,500 per month per studio ongoing.

To help establish FM broadcasting stations inside Afghanistan, please contact:

Olga Swenzowa  
Resistance International  
102 Avenue Des Champs Elysees  
75008 Paris, France  
Tel. 562-8690 (Paris)

or

Andrew L. Eiva  
The Federation for American Afghan Action  
236 Massachusetts Avenue N.E. Suite 603  
Washington, D.C. 20002  
Tel. (202) 547-0202.

## CLOTHING FOR TRANSPORT

The Afghan people need clothing. Flat soled shoes, boots, used pants, shirts and coats are desperately needed in Afghanistan. Andrew L. Eiva, executive director of the Federation for American Afghan Action, traveled with the resistance several years ago. He remembers to this day the determination of the freedom fighters, who climbed endless miles across the rugged Afghan terrain, even through snow, barefoot. Eiva recalls that in a group of twenty men, every foot was gnarled and bleeding. Yet they walked on, committed to the cause of freedom.

Habib Mayar, of the Afghan Community In America, ships shoes, boots and used clothing from his warehouse in New York to Afghanistan. To provide clothing directly to a particular city in Afghanistan you must have a complete bale of clothing weighing approximately 800 lbs. accompanied by the address of the recipient, and a \$40 baling charge per bale. If you wish to send clothing to the Afghan people in general, you can send it in smaller amounts without a baling charge.

The best way to get clothing to Mr. Mayar's warehouse in New York is by making arrangements with commercial airlines that fly from your local airport to Laguardia or JFK. Most lines will do this free of charge if they are notified the goods are for a humanitarian cause. Address the clothing shipment to:

Afghan Community In America  
Habib Mayar, Chairman  
139-15 95th Avenue  
Jamaica, N.Y. 11346  
Tel. (718) 658-3737.

The airline will notify Mr. Mayar when the shipment arrives.

Note: Among a people who are fighting for their very survival, items such as high-heeled shoes, bras, panties and clothing accessories are not needed. The people will be best served by durable garments and sturdy, flat-soled foot wear.

## SHIPPING METAL DETECTORS TO THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE

One of the great needs to help the Afghan resistance secure the lives and freedom of the Afghan people is for metal detectors. The detectors can be used to locate Soviet mines which are planted all across the Afghan countryside and pose a threat to the civilian population. Many civilians, including women and children have already been killed or maimed by Soviet mines.

The Federation for American Afghan Action is able, through the generosity of Metal Detectors of Delaware, to supply metal detectors to the resistance at a 20 percent discount. The cost for the appropriate detector is \$355.88.

Accompanying the money for the detectors should be the name of your partner city. The Federation will ensure the detectors get to resistance forces operating in that area. If you do not yet have a partner city, the Federation will send the detectors where they are most needed. All of the money will be used for the purchase and shipping of metal detectors.

Send to:

The Federation for American Afghan Action  
236 Massachusetts Avenue N.E.  
Suite 603  
Washington D.C. 20002