



# Federation for American Afghan Action

Executive Director  
Andrew L. Eiva

## Board Members

Neal B. Blair—Chairman  
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Thomas Gouttierre

## STATE DEPARTMENT AND CIA POLICY IN AFGHANISTAN - WHAT AFGHANS AND AMERICANS TOGETHER WILL DO TO FIX THEM

### OPEN LETTER TO THE LEADERS OF THE VISITING AFGHAN FREEDOM FIGHTER DELEGATION

The presence of the leaders of the Afghan freedom fighters in America is a major opportunity to address several major problems still blocking a commitment by the United States to a complete Afghan victory.

The minimum objective of your visit should be to re-establish an Afghan/U.S. relationship that has not existed since the Soviet invasion in 1978. Present U.S. policy is the result of the CIA/Pakistan relationship which now precludes a real Afghan/U.S. one.

The State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) are attempting to manipulate the visit of the Afghan freedom fighters. Their manipulations endanger the American Afghan friendship. Most Americans believe in God and the cause of freedom. They also believe in the struggle of Afghanistan. But the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency do not practice these same beliefs. In general, their influence of your visit is an attempt to preserve their own present policy. The CIA and State Department policy has cost a million Afghan lives who were spent too cheaply.

Your meeting with President Ronald Reagan, Senators and Representatives, other influential Americans, and the American media, are your key weapons to overcome the State Department and CIA inability to implement presidential policy which amounts to subverting this policy. The following is the list of State Department and CIA policies and the opportunities that you have to overturn them:

*June 1986*

**CIA POLICY ON AFGHANISTAN: PROBLEMS AND  
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AFGHAN FREEDOM FIGHTERS**

**IN PRIORITY ORDER**

The CIA is playing a major role in the implementation of Afghan aid. This results in the following policies, problems and recommendations:

CIA Policy 1: The control of arms distribution in Pakistan is in the hands of one man who is following his own agenda, Lieutenant General Aktar Abdul Rehman of Pakistan's Interservice Intelligence. He uses his power to control the distribution to manipulate Afghan resistance leaders one against another. Pakistani generals Fazle Haq and Rahmatullah Khan have apparently amassed ostentatious wealth upwards of a million dollars each.

Recommended Response to CIA Policy 1: Inform the President, the Congress, the American media, and other friends that the only way to achieve effective support will be to get the arms directly to those who fight under the overall political control of the Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahadeen. The CIA has already done two secret studies of how an airlift to the Afghan freedom fighters would work, but are too closely connected to their Pakistani friends who do not want an air bridge.

Current Status: Last year, a group of key congressional and administration players on the Afghan issue made a push for an air bridge as the only viable solution to the problem. It seems to have fizzled out, and as of this moment FAAA has not been able to determine the cause, but expects to know in the next several days.

CIA Policy 2. CIA controls all the military aid from the American people to the Afghan people. Over \$1 billion dollars has gone to the CIA in the name of the Afghan resistance. A small part of this reaches the Afghan resistance. But most congressmen and Americans still believe our money is going to the Afghans, not the CIA. Most congressmen and Americans want to believe our CIA and have no idea of the massive dimensions of corruption and waste in the CIA program.

Recommended Response to Policy 2. We Americans, through a unanimous vote in Congress, instructed our government in 1984 that, "It would be indefensible to give the Afghan freedom fighters only enough to fight and die but not enough to advance their cause for freedom." Once you, the leaders of an Afghan nation in a desperate struggle against genocide tell us, all of us, what is really going on, we won't stand for it. Tell the

Press, Congress, and particularly members of the Senate and House Intelligence committees.

Current Status: The CIA by playing off liberal and conservatives tendencies against each other has managed to totally deflect effective oversight by the Senate and House Intelligence Committees. Liberation PAC is putting together information packets to go to the opponents of incumbent members of the Senate and House Intelligence Committees.

CIA Policy 3. Refusal to improve the half-hearted military training program in which the instructors are frequently more ignorant than the students. In recent cases, the Pakistanis were teaching the Afghan Mujahadeen how to operate Russian and Chinese weapons which the Pakistani trainers did not know how to operate.

Recommended Response to CIA Policy 3: Tell the President, the Congress, and the American media that effective training under the authority of the Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahideen is now the most vital need of the Afghan resistance.

Current Status: No change.

**STATE DEPARTMENT POLICY ON AFGHANISTAN: PROBLEMS AND  
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MUJAHADEEN LEADERS.**

**IN PRIORITY ORDER**

State Department Policy 1. The State Department treats Pakistan as more important than Afghanistan. Over 3 billion dollars in aid has gone to Pakistan because of Afghanistan. The Congress also appropriated \$1 billion dollars for the Afghans. The \$1 billion actually went to the CIA in the name of the Afghans. A major slice of the CIA's (Afghan) billion goes to Pakistanis.

Recommended Response to Policy 1. Ask for an accounting of how this \$4 billion has been spent. Ensure that the President, Congress and the American media understand that although Congress and the American people gave \$4 billion in the name of Afghan freedom, the State Department sent this money to support Pakistan's status-quo.

Current Status: State Department is preparing a \$4.02 billion dollar request of aid to the dictatorship of Pakistan and opposes any effort to get aid to the Afghan freedom fighters in a way that would bypass Pakistan.

State Department Policy 2. The State Department supports the exclusion of the Afghan resistance from participation in the Geneva peace talks. Robert Peck, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs admitted 6 weeks ago, that the State Department did not ask the UN to admit the Afghan resistance to the Geneva talks and does not plan to do so.

Recommended Response to Policy 2. Inform the President, Congress, American media, and other friends in the United States of how the State Department is not requesting that the UN admit the Afghans at the Geneva talks. The State Department ignores a million Afghans who have given their lives for the right to decide their own future.

Current Status: On Monday, Shultz and Armacost claimed to the resistance leaders that they will ask the UN to include the Afghans in the negotiations, but did not say when.

State Department Policy 3. The State Department maintains diplomatic relations with the Soviet-installed DRA element in Kabul. State Department officials are blocking congressional efforts to transfer diplomatic relations to the legitimate representatives of the Afghan people - the Mujahadeen.

Recommended Response to Policy 3. In meetings with the President, the Congress, the American media, tell them that the State Department's preference to have diplomatic relations with the Soviet-installed DRA element instead of the Afghan nation, is a slap in the face of the Afghan people.

Current Status: The State Department has succeeded in persuading Ronald Reagan to deny diplomatic relations to the Afghan resistance. Shultz and Armacost told the resistance leaders Monday that after the alliance functions some time longer (whatever that means) such diplomatic relations might be considered. The Afghan delegation, perhaps a bit overwhelmed by the meeting, has not yet reacted to this.

State Department Policy 4. The State Department has declared its willingness to support whatever decision Pakistan and the DRA decide concerning the fate of the Afghan people with an arms cut-off. Arnold Raphel is the State Department official who drafted this incredible document without President Reagan's knowledge. Some Afghans told us that the DRA used Mr. Raphel's "guarantee" to show everyone that the United States is prepared to make a deal with the Soviet-installed element in Kabul by cutting off the Afghans fighting for their freedom.

Recommended Response to Policy 4. Inform the President, Congress, American media, and other friends in the United States how the DRA element used Mr. Raphel's document.

Current Status: The Afghan leaders are less concerned about this than their friends in the United States. They feel they can survive an arms cut-off while a withdrawal is taking place.

### CONCLUSION

The struggle of the Afghan people against the Soviet superpower is the most heroic struggle ever recorded in the history of warfare. By so doing, the Afghans astonished the Soviets, the West, and the Islamic world. The American people believe in you and support your struggle. But if the CIA and the State Department succeed in controlling your relationship with the American people, then this trip will be wasted.



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Andrew L. Eiva

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Thomas Gouttierre

June 17, 1986  
HAND DELIVERED  
URGENT

**Event: Congressional Reception for the Afghans at 2172 RHOB,  
June 18, Wednesday at 5:30 p.m..**

**Purpose: Urgent New Role for Congress in Afghan/American  
relationship.**

Dear Representative,

Officials at the State Department and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) who control the Afghan delegation itinerary are still trying to keep the Afghans from deciding their own future. The Afghans have been told that they must come to terms with the current policies of the State Department and the CIA without a frank relationship with Congress and the American people.

But the Afghans lack exposure to our form of democracy. They fail to understand the financial, moral and political leverage that Congress has over the Executive Branch bureaucracies. As a result, the CIA and State Department bureaucrats have so far succeeded in reining in their candor on this trip. But you can change this.

Your willingness to convince the Afghans at Wednesday's reception of your congressional leverage over these bureaucracies, will help the Afghans to do what they came here to do: to forge a viable Afghan/American relationship. Right now, we still have a CIA/Pakistan relationship which denies Afghan victory and perverts American ideals.

The key issues that pertain to the Afghan/American relationship are in the enclosed pages. Thank you.

Sincerely,

Andrew L. Eiva  
Executive Director



# Federation for American Afghan Action

## NEWS



214 Massachusetts Avenue, N.E.  
Suite 510  
Washington, D.C. 20002  
(202) 547-0202

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

JUNE 13, 1986  
9:00 A.M.

Contact: David Dienstag  
(202) 547-0202  
(202) 547-0201

### BUREAUCRATS KEEPING COVERT LID ON PRESIDENTIAL MEETING WITH AFGHAN LEADERS.

Today at 2:05 p.m., the highest ranking Afghan resistance delegation to ever visit the United States is scheduled to arrive at New York's Kennedy International airport for an official five day visit to the United States which will include a meeting with President Ronald Reagan.

Burhanuddin Rabbani, the current spokesman of the Islamic Unity of Afghanistan Mujahideen, and also the leader of the jamiat islami, leads the delegation. Other major resistance leaders include: Sibjhautullah Mojadedi, leader of the Afghan National Liberation Front, Maulawi Mohammedi Nebi, leader of the Arakat Islami, possibly the numerically largest of the 7 factions, Pir Sayed Gailani, the leader of the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan. The other three factions are also sending high ranking representatives.

Although the people administering the trip are attempting to keep the details covert, the Federation for American Afghan Action has learned of the following items on the agenda.

Arrival is expected at Kennedy airport at 2:05 p.m. Sources in the White House report that Walter Raymond, a CIA career officer on loan to the White House, is managing the itinery.

The first known event in Washington D.C. will be the meeting of the Afghan resistance delegation with the Afghan community at John Adams High School in Alexandria Virginia, at 2:00 p.m., June 15th. This event was specifically requested by the Afghan delegation. The delegation is expected to meet President Reagan at the White House on the morning of Monday, June 16.

At 2:00 p.m. on the 16th, the National Press Club has apparently been reserved for a press conference for the visiting delegation.

Ambassador Charles Dunbar at the State Department appears to be the key action officer for the visit, which has transpired at the behest of President Ronald Reagan. The close bureaucratic hold on the trip's itinerary has limited access to a small number of inside bureaucratic players, excluding even the resistance's own resident representative in Washington, Professor M. Nebi Salehi.

The Federation for American Afghan Action believes that this exclusive hold is designed to ensure that the following elements of US covert policy to the Afghans remain undisturbed:

1. Covert distribution of arms remaining under the control of Lieutenant General Aktar Abdul Rehman of Pakistan's Interservice Intelligence, who uses the distribution pipeline to manipulate Afghan resistance leaders one against the other.

2. Maintenance of American diplomatic relations with the Soviet-installed element in Kabul and State Department lobbying against congressional initiatives to transfer American relations to the legitimate representatives of the Afghan people - the Afghan resistance.

3. Five years of Most Favored Nation Trade status with the

-More-

Soviet installed element in Afghanistan, which was finally overturned only after an intensive congressional campaign which included 65 Senate co-sponsors.

4. Complicity in efforts to exclude the Afghan resistance from participation in the Geneva peace talks, to include State Department refusal to ask the United Nations to admit the Afghan people at talks to decide their own future.

5. Refusal to improve the half-hearted military training program in which the instructors are frequently more ignorant than the students.

6. Leaving the responsibility and authority for arms delivery to the Afghans under Pakistani control, which means that the level of arms is kept at a level that will not provoke Pakistan's northern neighbor. This requires aid be kept at a level denying Afghan victory.

7. Continue to leave overall responsibility for the management of the covert operation in the hands of the CIA's Directorate of Operations, which continues to demonstrate a remarkable immunity to improvement.

8. The diversion of most of the \$1 billion worth of congressional appropriations for the Afghan resistance into areas not intended by the American people.

"The meeting of the Afghan leaders with President Reagan has the potential to penetrate the six years of bureaucratic myopia and corruption that has crippled the war effort so far," said Andrew Eiva, the Executive Director of Federation for American Afghan Action. "But it will take the best efforts of all the well meaning individuals involved to crack our government's disinformation curtain."



# Federation for American Afghan Action

## NEWS



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Suite 510  
Washington, D.C. 20002  
(202) 547-0202

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

JUNE 16, 1986  
9:00 A.M.

Contact: Andrew Eiva  
(202) 547-0202, (202) 546-6971

### GRASSROOTS LOBBY GROUPS PUT PRESSURE ON BUREAUCRATS TO CRACK BOTTLENECKS IN AFGHAN/AMERICAN RELATIONS

The Federation for American Afghan Action (FAAA) and Free The Eagle Sunday, June 15, handed the Afghan Mujahadeen a document identifying the key bottlenecks causing the ongoing waste and lethargy that afflicts America's covert program to aid the Afghans. This is intended for use in the Afghan delegation's meeting with President Ronald Reagan at 11:30 this morning which will be followed by 2:00 p.m. press conference at the National Press Club in Washington.

This document is important since the Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahadeen, representing the seven major organizations in the resistance, has been functioning as a governmental entity for the past year. The Afghan acceptance of President Reagan's invitation represents the beginning of a direct and honest relationship between Americans and Afghans.

State Department and White House officials currently controlling the program are struggling to keep their present policy undisturbed through a tight control of the Afghan freedom fighters schedule over the most substantive meetings.

For example, government officials gave M. Nabi Salehi, the resident representative in Washington of Islamic Unity of Afghanistan Mujahadeen, a number of false arrival times in an attempt to prevent him from meeting the delegation as they arrived. However in the confusion generated, the only people who ended up welcoming the arrival of the delegation at Dulles Airport at 6:05 p.m. June 14, were Mr. Salehi and Andrew Eiva the Executive Director of the FAAA. A harried Ambassador Charles Dunbar showed up with his contingent of diplomatic limousines twenty minutes later.

The enclosed packet has already been given to all members of the Afghan delegation and additional packets are on the way to members of Congress and the media. "If the truth gets to the decision makers, the major hurdles preventing Afghan victory will be cleared," said Andrew Eiva.



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The State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) are attempting to manipulate the visit of the Afghan freedom fighters. Their manipulations endanger the American Afghan friendship. Most Americans believe in God and the cause of freedom. They also believe in the struggle of Afghanistan. But the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency do not practice these same beliefs. In general, their influence of your visit is an attempt to preserve their own present policy. The CIA and State Department policy has cost a million Afghan lives who were spent too cheaply.

Your meeting with President Ronald Reagan, Senators and Representatives, other influential Americans, and the American media, are your key weapons to overcome the State Department and CIA laziness in implementing presidential policy which amounted to subverting the policy. The following is the list of State Department and CIA policies and the opportunities that you have to overturn:

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Recommended Response to Policy 1. Inform the President, Congress, American media, and other friends in the United States of how the State Department is not requesting that the UN admit the Afghans at the Geneva talks. The State Department ignores a million Afghans who have given their lives for the right to decide their own future.

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Recommended Response to Policy 2. Inform the President, Congress, American media, and other friends in the United States how the DRA element used Mr. Raphel's document.

State Department Policy 3. It is not proven that the State Department is the prime mover behind Nake Kamrany, the key organizer of a new Afghan government in exile in Washington, but Kamrany claims to be a long term friend of Charles Dunbar, who handles such issues at the State Department. This puppet "exile" government is designed to put additional pressure on the real leadership of the Afghan resistance.

Recommended Response to Policy 3. If Afghan leaders ask Charles Dunbar to tell them if there is any official American backing for the "exile" government is taking place, Charles Dunbar will be forced to answer. Later events will determine if he is honest.

State Department Policy 4. The State Department maintains diplomatic relations with the Soviet-installed DRA element in Kabul. State Department officials are blocking congressional efforts to transfer diplomatic relations to the legitimate representatives of the Afghan people - the Mujahadeen.

Recommended Response to Policy 4. In meetings with the President, the Congress, the American media, tell them that the State

Department's preference to have diplomatic relations with the Soviet-installed DRA element instead of the Afghan nation, is a slap in the face of the Afghan people.

State Department Policy 5. The State Department treats Pakistan as more important than Afghanistan. Over 3 billion dollars in aid has gone to Pakistan because of Afghanistan. The Congress also appropriated \$1 billion dollars for the Afghans. The \$1 billion actually went to the CIA in the name of the Afghans. A major slice of the CIA's (Afghan) billion goes to Pakistanis.

Recommended Response to Policy 5. Ask for an accounting of how this \$4 billion has been spent. Ensure that the President, Congress and the American media understand that although Congress and the American people gave \$4 billion in the name of Afghan freedom, the State Department sent this money to support Pakistan's status-quo.

## **CIA POLICY ON AFGHANISTAN: PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

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Recommended Response to Policy 2. We Americans, through a unanimous vote in Congress, instructed our government in 1984 that, "It would be indefensible to give the Afghan freedom fighters only enough to fight and die but not enough to advance their cause for freedom." Once you, the leaders of an Afghan nation in a desperate struggle against genocide tell us, all of us, what is really going on, we won't stand for it. Tell the Press, Congress, and particularly members of the Senate and House Intelligence committees.

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Recommended Response to CIA Policy 3: Tell the President, the Congress, and the American media that effective training under the authority of the Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahideen is now the most vital need of the Afghan resistance.



## CONCLUSION

The struggle of the Afghan people against the Soviet superpower is the most heroic struggle ever recorded in the history of warfare. By so doing, the Afghans astonished the Soviets, the West, and the Islamic world. The American people believe in you and support your struggle. But if the CIA and the State Department succeed in controlling your relationship with the American people, then this trip will be wasted.

Andrew L. Eiva

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Andrew L. Eiva". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Andrew" being more prominent and the last name "Eiva" following in a similar style.

Executive Director  
Federation for American  
Afghan Action