

THE REAGAN DOCTRINE - FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY

WHAT IS NEEDED IN 1986

Drafted for Robert Walker

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SITUATION - THE GOOD NEWS

The United States is closer than at any moment since World War II to serious support for freedom fighters.

a. The Tsongas resolution in 1984, calling for effective aid to the Afghans, was the first legislation ever to pass Congress in support of a resistance movement. Congress then put its money where its mouth was, appropriating \$470 million to the CIA in the name of the Afghan resistance in fiscal year 1986.

b. The President has officially, but secretly, followed suit, signing National Security Decision Directive 166 in April of 1985, defining a new U.S. policy to get the Soviets out of Afghanistan "by all means available" instead of the "no-win" policy followed for the first five years of the Reagan administration.

c. The removal on March 4th, 1986, of the top bureaucratic foe of aid to freedom fighters, William Casey's second-in-command, John McMahon, opened the door to better United States support for freedom fighters. The preliminary decision to send two hundred Stingers to Afghanistan and Angola resulted directly from McMahon's removal, taking place in the same week.

d. Last fall, Dr. Charles Moser organized the Resistance Support Alliance which provides the political network for pro-freedom fighter organizations, and Dr. Warren Carroll published The Freedom Fighter Monthly which is now the central clearinghouse for non-governmental freedom fighter information.

SITUATION - THE BAD NEWS

Bureaucratic Opposition Continues Inside Administration

Reagan's CIA still gives freedom fighters only enough to fight and die. Bureaucrats inside the CIA and Pentagon still perceive the Reagan Doctrine as a temporary political aberration to be ignored that will soon go away. For six years they have squelched the pro-freedom fighter elements inside the bureaucracy as follows:

a. In Afghanistan, the White House and Congress backed their calls for effectiveness with budgets, but the CIA refused to provide meaningful training or good air defense weapons until intense congressional pressure produced a small shipment of Stingers.

b. In Nicaragua, early CIA support violated guerrilla warfare doctrine by sacrificing popular links for superficial short-term gains, making the eventual victory of freedom in Nicaragua costlier and harder to support politically.

c. During the March debate on aid to the Contras, CIA officers actively lobbied against the President, affecting swing votes for the margin of defeat.

d. Although Reagan called for giving the freedom fighters enough to "win freedom", during his State of the Union Address, the word "victory" has yet to cross the lips of policymakers running CIA operations to support the Afghan, Angolan, Cambodian, or Nicaraguan resistance movements. CIA implementation remains "only enough to fight and die."

Pro-freedom Fighter Momentum in Danger

a. Defeatist elements in both House and Senate mounted a counterattack in recent weeks. In March, Congressman Lee Hamilton introduced legislation in the House to cut off aid to UNITA. In April, Senator Deconcini introduced legislation in the Senate to block Stingers to Afghanistan and Angola.

b. Momentum is now with the freedom fighter issue, but the momentum is in danger of stalling. Confusion over our policies, complexities of international diplomacy, the unsuitability of our current bureaucracies, the confusing definitions of overt, covert, and international legal terms, provide the last formidable obstacle to a victorious implementation of the Reagan doctrine. Because there are now no serious initiatives inside or outside government to overcome these obstacles, the momentum is in danger. A focused effort to overcome the remaining obstacles is now critical.

THE OBJECTIVE OF THE PROPOSAL

The American Afghan Education Fund (AAEF) needs \$9,700.00 to implement the Reagan Doctrine by focusing on direct projects in the following five areas; Senate, House of Representatives, White House, grassroots, and media, through the remainder of 1986.

FIVE COMPLEMENTARY PROJECT CONCEPTS TO IMPLEMENT
THE REAGAN DOCTRINE

The concept of operation in each of the five areas is as follows:

- a. House of Representatives - The creation of a low-profile, multi-ideological, congressional working group to assess alternative methods of supporting freedom fighters and make recommendations.
- b. Senate - Develop the capability to conduct meaningful oversight of resistance support operations.
- c. White House - Create White House capability to orchestrate resistance support operations by designating an office to take charge of Afghan military and political support, similar to Elliot Abrams' role on Nicaragua.
- d. Media - Prepare article(s) in at least one foreign policy journal conceptualizing what America needs to do to support freedom movements effectively.
- e. Grassroots - Generate briefing papers for members of both parties to use in 1986 elections against incumbents. Create a CIA accountability coalition.

IMPLEMENTATION

The implementation in each of the five areas is achievable as follows:

a. House of Representatives - Congressman Wyche Fowler, the top expert on resistance support operations on the House side and a member of the Intelligence Committee for eight years, offered to lend his name to a Congressional working group to evaluate, select, and legislate the creation of an American resistance support capability. Because legislation dealing with five of the anti-communist resistance movements is up for consideration in the House of Representatives, many Congressmen have begun to recognize the need for a better way of dealing with American support for resistance movements. So far, none of them have come up with the energy and vision to lead on this issue, and at least eighty hours of qualified "off-the-hill" manpower is needed to bring the working group to fruition with its goals accomplished.

b. White House - Senator Gordon Humphrey made the creation of a special White House position on Afghanistan, an Afghan "Czar", his top priority for 1986. So far, this is getting nowhere because an organized and sustained effort will be necessary to create such a position and to insure that a properly motivated and qualified individual is selected. There is no political opposition to such a step, and it will tear the function out of the defeatist clutch of the CIA bureaucrats.

c. Grassroots - The recent departure of John McIlhannon has demonstrated the power of grassroots in overcoming bureaucratic inertia.

(1) Focused grassroots activity will be targeted at Congressional incumbents, particularly members of the intelligence committees who have been co-opted by defeatist elements of the intelligence community. This will include the multi-ideological and non-political distribution of useable information to challengers of both parties.

(2) Additionally, a CIA accountability coalition will be formed of grassroots organizations interested in effective aid to freedom fighters to press for a better professional product capable of delivering victory.

d. Media - Several magazines including Policy Review, National Review, and The New York Times Magazine have professed interest in a thinkpiece on the difficulties of and solutions to implementing the Reagan Doctrine. Such a piece, free from the distortions of the political process, will clarify the values, interests, and principles which the Reagan Doctrine will need to incorporate to be effective.

e. Senate - The Senate Intelligence Committee now has the most extensive staff outside the CIA and Pentagon bureaucracies in the area of resistance support. For example, their staffers inspected the arms delivery documents and receipts of Lieutenant General Akhtar Abdul Rehman, this January. (Lt. Gen. Akhtar has played a central role in the abuse of distribution of covert arms to Afghan freedom fighters.) Nevertheless, the Senate staffers did not have the expertise to conduct a meaningful inspection. Twenty-five qualified man hours of motivation and training is necessary to provide the expertise necessary for an oversight trip being planned for May. This will provide a practical way of translating the political principle of victory into concrete day-to-day transactions.

CREDENTIALS

Credentials of AAEF Executive Director, Andrew Eiva:

a. Three years in Washington working for the Afghan and Angolan resistance movements to include:

(1) Drafting and passage of the Afghan Effective Support Resolution, culminating with the inclusion of its key rhetoric in President Reagan's State of the Union Address in 1986.

(2) Increasing the annual covert appropriations from \$50 million to \$470 million.

(3) Identifying John McMahon as the key blockage to effective aid to the freedom fighters and initiating the campaign for his removal.

(4) Identifying the specific problems in CIA air defense weapons for the Afghans culminating in the decision to provide Stingers.

(5) Developing working relations with mainstream media, resulting in favorable coverage from the New York Times, Washington Post, and personal appearances on ABC and CBS news shows.

(6) Unique access to classified information through intelligence committees, media, and the bureaucracies dealing with on-going operations to support resistance movements.

(7) A sound working relationship with Free the Eagle, rapidly becoming the country's most effective grassroots lobby.

b. Extensive fieldwork with the Afghan freedom fighters against the Red Army to include:

(1) Development and implementation of Operation Bastille, the safeguarding of live Soviets in Afghan hands to encourage larger-scale defections and desertions, resulting in the increase of live Soviet prisoners from zero to over two hundred.

(2) Provided on-site technical support to Radio Free Kabul, a small network of guerrilla FM portable radio transmitters inside Afghanistan.

(3) Provided limited training to Afghans in marksmanship, demolitions, mine detection, tactics, and communications.

c. Three and a half years of Green Beret experience to include:

- (1) Planning the conduct of low-level aircraft penetration of Soviet airspace to supply guerrillas.
- (2) Command of Soviet-oriented Green Beret A-team.
- (3) Expertise with the full range of guerrilla small arms.
- (4) Development of concept paper at the request of General Robert C. Kingston, Special Forces Commander in 1976, to improve the Green Berets' capability to support resistance forces, which he ordered to be implemented.

IMMEDIACY

a. Time is running out on the Reagan Administration's ability to initiate changes in White House organization.

b. Only a three-month window remains in which to get any business done in the House of Representatives before it becomes consumed with election politics.

c. Congressional and senatorial campaigns are already underway and time is running out in which to provide the relevant materials.

d. Key senate intelligence oversight trip to Pakistan's tribal area is scheduled in May.

BUDGET BY PROJECT

	<u>Project Expenses</u>	<u>Project Subtotals</u>
<u>House Working Group</u>		
2 weeks highly qualified manpower	\$1,000	
2 weeks low qualified manpower	500	
Production and dissemination costs, long distance calls, administration	300	
Travel expenses for key expert witnesses	2,000	
		\$3,800
<u>White House</u>		
3 weeks highly qualified manpower	1,500	
		\$1,500
<u>Grassroots</u>		
Writing, production, and dissemination of materials	1,000	
		\$1,000
<u>Media</u>		
2 weeks qualified manpower	1,000	
		\$1,000
<u>Senate Oversight</u>		
1 week qualified manpower	400	
Expenses associated with oversight oversight trip	1,900	
		\$2,300
<u>OVERALL TOTAL</u>		\$9,700